Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice by Alexander, Lisa T.
William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 2 Article 2
Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice
Lisa T. Alexander
Copyright c 2013 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Repository Citation
Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 309 (2013),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol4/iss2/2
309 
CYBERFINANCING FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 
LISA T. ALEXANDER 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues for the socially optimal regulation of online peer-
to-peer (P2P) lending and crowdfunding to advance economic justice in 
the United States. Peer-to-peer lending websites, such as Prosper.com or 
Kiva.org, facilitate lending transactions between individuals online with-
out the involvement of a traditional bank or microfinance institution. 
Crowdfunding websites, such as Kickstarter.com, enable individuals to ob-
tain financing from large numbers of contributors at once through an open 
online request for funds. These web-based transactions, and the intermediary 
organizations that facilitate them, constitute emerging cyberfinancing markets. 
These markets connect many individuals at once, across class, race, eth-
nicity, nationality, space, and time in an interactive and dynamic way. Dur-
ing a time of significant economic distress in the United States, these mar-
kets also represent an unprecedented economic development opportunity 
for historically marginalized economic actors. Yet, no legal scholar has 
addressed the implications of these developments for economic justice in 
the United States. Drawing from the fields of law and geography, social 
networking theory, and comparative institutional analysis, this Article con-
ceptualizes these new markets as “cyberspaces,” similar to geographic spac-
es, whose laws, norms, and rules will partially determine who will benefit 
from the economic opportunities that arise in these spaces. The recently 
enacted Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act does not facilitate 
substantial distributive justice in crowdfunding markets. The U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO), which produced a report in response to 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act’s mandate that it study the 
P2P lending industry, has also failed to recommend a regulatory structure 
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that will facilitate economic justice. This Article recommends that a range 
of federal regulators such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and 
the U.S. Treasury Department (Treasury), should collaborate to imple-
ment a revised Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) that would promote 
economic justice in these markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social networking via the Internet now presents an unprecedented op-
portunity to link previously disconnected populations. Web 2.0 technolo-
gies1 create participatory communities of interest that link the poor and the 
wealthy and defy the traditional limitations of geographically-bounded 
space. Mobile phones now provide inexpensive Internet access, mitigating 
the digital divide between poorer and richer consumers and enabling poor-
er individuals to access Web 2.0 technologies.2 Wealthy individuals can 
now lend to poorer individuals, residing in any location, via peer-to-peer 
(P2P) lending websites such as Prosper.com or Kiva.org.3 These websites 
enable individuals to lend to one another online without the intermediation 
of a traditional bank or financial institution. Crowdfunding4 websites, such 
as Kickstarter.com, now enable budding entrepreneurs, residing anywhere 
that has Internet access, to raise capital from individuals by soliciting con-
tributions, or equity investments, through an open online call for funds. 
These crowdfunding websites help entrepreneurs connect with large num-
bers of people at once, across the globe, to seek financing. 
During a time of economic distress in the United States,5 these cyberfi-
nancing websites present new economic development opportunities for in-
experienced, geographically isolated and historically marginalized econom-
ic actors. Yet, no legal scholar has addressed the implications of these 
developments for economic justice6 in the United States.7 Drawing from the 
                                                 
1 The term Web 2.0 generally describes web applications that facilitate “participatory 
information sharing, interoperability, user-centered design and collaboration on the 
Internet or World Wide Web.” Web 2.0, COMPUGAIN, http://www.compugain.com/taxo
nomy/term/43/0 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
2 RICHARD HEEKS, DEVELOPMENT 2.0: TRANSFORMATIVE ICT-ENABLED DEVELOPMENT 
MODELS AND IMPACTS 1 (Development Informatics Short Paper No. 11, 2010), available 
at http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/idpm/research/publications/wp/di/sh ort/di_sp11.pdf. 
3 See, e.g., PROSPER.COM, http://www.prosper.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“We 
connect people who want to invest money with people who want to borrow money.”); 
KIVA.ORG, Loans That Change Lives, http://www.kiva.org/home (last visited Mar. 23, 
2013) (“Empower people around the world with a $25 loan.”). 
4 “Crowdfunding is an approach to raising capital for new projects and businesses by 
soliciting contributions from a large number of stakeholders” through Internet-based 
social networking sites. CROWDSOURCING.ORG, http://www.crowdsourcing.org/commun
ity/crowdfunding/7 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
5 See Hope Yen, U.S. Poverty on Track to Rise to Highest Since 1960s, 
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (July 22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/22/us
-poverty-level-1960s_n_1692744.html (explaining that economists predict that “[t]he 
official poverty rate will rise from 15.1 percent in 2010; climbing as high as 15.7 percent,” 
increasing the ranks of America’s poor to levels unseen in nearly half a century). 
6 The term, economic justice, as used here includes the concept of distributive justice, 
defined as “[j]ustice owed by a community to its members, including the fair disbursement 
 
2013] CYBERFINANCING FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 313 
fields of law and geography, social networking theory, and comparative insti-
tutional analysis, this Article conceptualizes these websites as “cyberspaces,” 
similar to geographic spaces, whose laws, community norms, and practices 
will, partially, determine who will benefit from the economic opportunities 
that occur in these “spaces.” These cyberspaces also create new communities 
online because they connect previously disconnected individuals, facilitate 
repeat transactions, and allow social networks to rate and evaluate partici-
pants. How the federal government regulates these emerging cyberfinanc-
ing communities will determine their redistributive potential. 
This Article argues that regulating cyberfinancing8 for economic justice 
will require a reconceptualization of the process of exchange between the 
wealthy and the poor, as well as of the traditional legal structures and com-
munity economic development practices that regulate exchanges between 
these groups. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), recently 
signed by President Obama,9 fails to increase, substantially, historically mar-
ginalized actors’ access to new crowdfunding markets. The GAO’s proposed 
regulatory structure for P2P lending markets also fails to advance economic 
                                                                                                                         
of common advantages and sharing of common burdens.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 869 
(7th ed. 1999). 
7 Legal scholars studying domestic P2P lending have not recommended a regulatory 
structure to maximize the participation of economic actors historically marginalized from 
mainstream American markets. See, e.g., Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-
to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445 (2011); Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey Rapp, 
Regulating Online Peer-to-Peer Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an 
Evolving Regulatory Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485 
(2012); Sarah B. Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions for Microfinance 
Lenders, 61 SMU L. REV. 1525 (2008). Some legal scholars have analyzed the implications 
of P2P lending for international law and development, but do not recommend a specific 
scheme for U.S. regulation of P2P lending. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer 
to Peer Financing for Development: Regulating the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 1209 (2010); Raj M. Desai & Homi Kharas, Democratizing Foreign Aid: Online 
Philanthropy and International Development, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1111 (2010). 
Legal scholars discussing crowdfunding have not proposed how to regulate the industry to 
advance distributive justice. See, e.g., C. Stephen Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal 
Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Bradford, Crowdfunding]; 
Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding Microstartups: It’s Time for the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to Approve a Small Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973 (2011); Edan 
Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities 
Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 63 (2011). Legal scholars studying U.S.-based 
community economic development law have also not turned their attention to these markets. 
8 This Article coins the term “cyberfinancing” to describe both online P2P financing 
and crowdfunding websites that enable financial transactions between users online. 
9 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
[hereinafter JOBS Act]. 
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justice.10 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the pri-
mary regulator of P2P lending and crowdfunding websites, is regulating 
these markets in a manner that restricts marginalized actors’ access. This 
Article proposes that U.S. regulators, and industry self-regulatory groups, 
should collaborate to implement a revised Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) that would cover the cyberfinancing intermediary organizations 
that create these websites and that would promote economic justice in the-
se markets. While overregulation could increase the costs of participation, 
thereby undermining access, the regulatory structure proposed here incen-
tivizes participation, thereby reducing the costs of the regulatory burden. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the law’s role in creating, and demarcat-
ing, economically marginalized, racially identified, and geographically 
isolated spaces. Part I.A explains how creditworthy or entrepreneurially 
promising individuals living in such communities are still isolated from 
American mainstream markets. Part I.B explicates how some residents 
developed informal and extra-legal responses to that economic and geo-
graphic isolation: responses such as face-to-face, peer-to-peer lending or 
participation in unregulated fringe financial markets. Part I.B also de-
scribes how American community economic development (CED) laws 
incentivize public and private investment in formally disinvested commu-
nities and formalize face-to-face peer lending by subsidizing community-
based non-profit organizations and microfinance institutions. The ad-
vantages and disadvantages of these approaches provide lessons for how 
to regulate new cyberfinancing markets. 
In Part II, the Article highlights examples of online P2P lending and 
crowdfunding and explains the legal mechanisms and institutions through 
which such market exchanges occur. It asserts that the SEC’s regulation of 
cyberfinancing websites has led to a contraction of the market that excludes 
more marginalized borrowers. It also argues that current and proposed U.S. 
reforms do not substantially advance distributive justice in these markets. 
Finally, in Part III, the Article draws on theoretical work on space, commu-
nity, and power in the “networked society,” as well as comparative institu-
tional analysis, to propose how cyberfinancing should be conceptualized 
and regulated. 
                                                 
10 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-613, PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING: 
NEW REGULATORY CHALLENGES COULD EMERGE AS THE INDUSTRY GROWS (2011), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320693.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; see also Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989F, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1947–48 (2010) (requiring that the Comptroller General of the United States and 
the United States Government Accountability Office should “determine the optimal Federal 
regulatory structure” for P2P lending). 
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I. THE LAW AND GEOGRAPHY OF ECONOMIC MARGINALIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. The Social and Legal Construction of Economic Marginality11 
Critical social theorists have long argued that the societal “meanings” of 
geographic space are socially produced.12 Although geographic spaces con-
sist of tangible and natural physical objects, such as land, sky, and trees, the 
social significance of these geographic formations is the product of social re-
lations. Thus, geographic spaces have socially constructed meanings that are 
reflections of historical, and present, social allocations of power. Law and 
geography scholars13 have long argued that law plays a constitutive role in the 
spatial allocations of power in various geographic areas.14 Thus, the social 
“meanings” assigned to places are partly constituted by legal representations 
of space. The boundaries, lines, and plats that divide up the physical world are 
given social significance through the laws of property, ownership, title, and 
                                                 
11 “Marginality is generally used to describe and analyse socio-cultural, political, and 
economic spheres, where disadvantaged people struggle to gain access (societal and spatial) 
to resources, and full participation in social life.” Ghana S. Gurung & Michael Kollmair, 
Marginality: Concepts and their Limitations (NCCR North South, Working Paper No. 4, 
2005), available at http://www.nccr-pakistan.org/publications_pdf/General/Marginality.pdf. 
12 See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Space, Knowledge & Power, in THE FOUCAULT READER 
239 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984) (“Space is fundamental in any form of communal life.”); 
HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 26 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 1991) 
(1974) (“(Social) space is a (social) product.”); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN 
GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY 79–80 (1989) 
(“Space in itself may be primordially given, but the organization, and meaning of space is 
a product of social-translation, transformation and experience.”). 
13 The work of law and geography scholars is too voluminous to cite in full, but the 
following works are representative of the field. See, e.g., THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES 
READER: LAW, POWER AND SPACE xviii (Nicholas Blomley et al., eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER]; LAW AND GEOGRAPHY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2002 
(Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds. 2002) [hereinafter LAW AND GEOGRAPHY]; 
NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER (1994); Richard 
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994) [hereinafter Ford, Boundaries of Race]; Hari Osofsky, A Law 
and Geography Perspective on the New Haven School, 32 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 421 
(2007); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 
(2002); Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the “Third World” in 
International Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000); Space 
Invaders, Symposium, Surveying Law and Borders, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1037 (1996). 
14 See LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 13, at xviii (“Boundaries mean. They 
signify, they differentiate, and they unify the insides of the spaces that they mark. What they 
mean refers to constellations of social relational power. And the form that this meaning 
often takes—the meaning social actors confer on lines and space—is legal meaning.”). 
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territory, as well as through jurisdictional boundaries that include certain 
physical areas within a particular neighborhood, municipality, town or vil-
lage. These territorialities15 enable public officials, and residents within geo-
graphically defined boundaries, to create political alliances, wield taxing and 
spending powers,16 and influence the boundaries and types of markets that 
operate within certain geographic spaces.17 These boundaries also empower 
individuals to include, or to exclude, others in their geographic communities 
or markets.18 These “complex territorial configurations”19 of the physical and 
material world often reinforce existing allocations of power and opportunity. 
Space, power, and law, then, are inextricably linked. 
Economic marginalization in the United States undeniably has a racial, 
ethnic, classed, gendered, and spatial dimension.20 As legal scholar Rich-
ard Thompson Ford explains, in America, space “is an ‘enabling technolo-
gy’ of race.”21 As David Delaney explains, the practices that established 
and maintained the racial purity and the political, economic, and social 
superiority of whites were fundamentally spatial practices such as the 
“slave quarters,” physically segregated housing, schooling, and socializing 
spaces.22 Many of these spatial practices were also legal practices such as: 
black codes, racially restrictive covenants, exclusionary zoning, and eminent 
domain laws, amongst other legal mechanisms.23 “Much of the meaning that 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW, 1836–1948, 6 (1998) (Ter-
ritoriality is “the assignment of a particular sort of meaning to lines and spaces in order to 
control, at first glance, determinable segments of the physical world. Upon further 
reflection, however, it is clear that the objects of control are social relationships and the 
actions and experiences of people.”). 
16 See id. at 6–7; see also Ford, Boundaries of Race, supra note 13, at 1844 (“The 
reification of boundaries in private associations has effects of racial segregation and 
economic stratification similar to those we uncovered in the public law context.”). 
17 See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, 73 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 55 (May–June 1995) (discussing the relationship between geographic location 
and business development). But see Scott L. Cummings, Between Markets and Politics: A 
Response to Porter’s Competitive Advantage Thesis, 82 OR. L. REV. 901, 903 (2003) 
(arguing that market development is the result of politics as well as individual choices). 
18 See supra note 13. 
19 See DELANEY, supra note 15, at 6 (“[C]omplex territorial configurations—and the 
codes of access, exclusion, and inclusion of which these configurations are the physical 
expression—are inseparable from the workings of larger-scale power orders such as those 
associated with, in our world, gender, race and class.”). 
20 See supra note 13. 
21 See LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 13, at xvi (citing Richard T. Ford, 
Urban Space and the Color Line: The Consequences of Demarcation and Disorientation 
in the Post-Modern Metropolis, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 99–123 (1999)). 
22 See DELANEY, supra note 15, at 10. 
23 See id. at 10–11. 
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is mapped onto lived-in landscapes is specifically legal meaning.”24 Cer-
tain physical areas, demarcated by legal apparatus such as street names, 
plats, lines, and titles, as well as incorporation or unincorporation, were 
designated as black, white, or immigrant areas.25 
These “racially identified spaces”26 also often became economically 
inferior spaces because the U.S. federal government and U.S. financial 
institutions refused to lend or invest in those areas.27 In 1933, during the 
Great Depression, Congress created the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) to help underwater homeowners facing foreclosure by refinanc-
ing home mortgages and reforming the home mortgage system.28 The 
HOLC devised a neighborhood-based rating system for determining home 
lending risks based upon the presumed credit quality of neighborhoods 
and their residents.29 HOLC appraisers “consistently undervalued black 
and integrated neighborhoods for the purpose of making new mortgage 
loans.”30 Appraisers identified minority neighborhoods by drawing red 
lines or circles around them on geographic maps,31 demarcating them and 
their residents as substantial credit and investment risks. 
U.S. private banks, using those same maps, “redlined”32 certain low-
income, urban, minority, and immigrant communities, designating anyone 
residing in these areas as a substantial credit risk based primarily upon the 
                                                 
24 Id. at 11. 
25 See Ford, Boundaries of Race, supra note 13. 
26 Id. at 1845 (defining “racially identified space” as “physical space primarily 
associated with and occupied by a particular racial group”); see also Elise C. Boddie, 
Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401 (arguing that places can have a racial identify 
based upon socially engrained racial biases about the inhabitants of those places). 
27 See generally Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: 
Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. 
L. J. 237, 241 (1996) (describing the history of public and private redlining); Richard 
Marsico, The Community Reinvestment Act, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A 
GUIDE TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 
403 (ABA 2009) [hereinafter Marsico, Community Reinvestment Act] (explaining that the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted to remedy redlining). 
28 Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—A Test Match for the Bankers: Glass 
Steagall vs. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081 (2010). 
29 Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 154, 163 
n.36 (2011) [hereinafter Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights] (defining “redlining” as “the 
government and industry practice that began in the 1920s and 1930s of assigning risks to 
neighborhoods ... based on assessments of their quality”). 
30 Id. at 163. 
31 See Hylton & Roug supra note 27, at 241; Marsico, Community Reinvestment Act, 
supra note 27, at 403; Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, supra note 29, at 163 n.36. 
32 See Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, supra note 29, at 163. 
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racial demographics of the area.33 Creditworthy individuals who lived in 
redlined communities were, therefore, discriminated against based upon 
both their race and their residence. Not only individuals, but also neigh-
borhoods were denied private investment and credit, leading to a wide-
spread disinvestment in certain neighborhoods where there were signifi-
cant numbers of minorities.34 This neighborhood-based disinvestment 
further solidified the poverty of many members of minority groups living 
in urban centers as jobs, property tax-financed education, and other forms 
of economic stability and social progress moved to suburban, predomi-
nately white communities. The quality of the social and educational ser-
vices available in these neighborhoods also declined as the economic re-
sources of these communities deteriorated. These dynamics led to an 
increasing spatial mismatch between low-income, urban minorities, avail-
able quality jobs, and financial opportunities.35 
While de jure discrimination, and intentional racial animus, initially 
created racially identified spaces, as legal scholar Richard Thompson Ford 
argues, “even in the absence of racism, race-neutral policy could be ex-
pected to entrench segregation and socio-economic stratification in a soci-
ety with a history of racism.”36 The racial, economic, and geographic iso-
lation caused by formal racism is maintained through the preservation of 
political and geographic territories. In a capitalistic society that privileges 
individual economic security, profit maximization by market actors, and 
state and local taxation as the means through which basic governmental 
services are provided, individuals and institutions may favor laws and pol-
icies that maintain the economic superiority of the geographic spaces they 
inhabit, even in the absence of intentional racism. Consequently, spaces 
“racially identified” as Black, for example, and economically marginalized 
as a result of that designation, would be disadvantaged in competitions with 
other geographic areas for residents, resources, opportunities, and markets.37 
                                                 
33 See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. 
L.J. 1177, 1214 (2012) (defining redlining as “the practice of not offering financial services 
in minority or low-income neighborhoods, sometimes indicated with a red line on a map”). 
34 See Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, supra note 29, at 163 (explaining that 
redlining contributed to the deterioration of predominately black neighborhoods). 
35 John F. Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan 
Decentralization, 82:2 Q. J. OF ECON. 175–97 (defining the spatial mismatch hypothesis). 
36 Ford, Boundaries of Race, supra note 13, at 1852. 
37 See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
418–19, 422 (1956) (arguing that people move from economically, socially, and politically 
disadvantageous localities to more advantageous ones); Lee Anne Fennell, Controlling 
Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 173 (2010) (explaining the Tiebout hypothesis). 
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To the extent that laws maintain the geographic boundaries of a given 
racially identified community, and that economic stratification remains 
pervasive within those areas, traditional financial institutions may still 
have rational economic reasons for credit and investment rationing in such 
areas.38 First, profit-motivated banks may be unable to overcome the inef-
ficiencies associated with lending to economically marginal individuals 
living in historically disinvested communities.39 If banks have insufficient 
branches in certain areas, they may suffer from information asymmetries, 
precluding them from learning about other factors that may make an oth-
erwise marginal borrower a good credit risk.40 The transaction costs asso-
ciated with the due diligence necessary to screen marginal borrowers or to 
make unsecured loans in relatively small amounts to marginal borrowers, 
may preclude banks from engaging in such transactions.41 
Second, banks no longer obtain information about potential borrowers 
solely through neighborhood-based branches. They also obtain this infor-
mation about prospective borrowers through automated underwriting 
computer models and risk profiling programs. Existing risk profiling and 
underwriting models may steer banks away from individuals who do not 
meet standardized lending profiles.42 These automated underwriting mod-
els may fail to identify individuals who are good credit risks because there 
is insufficient computer generated quantitative information about such in-
dividuals, such as credit or job histories.43 Additionally, if individuals re-
siding in historically disinvested communities have not had access to sig-
nificant educational or job opportunities, then angel or venture capital 
investors may lack information about their potential as entrepreneurs, and 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
841, 853–57 (1999); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Alan Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with 
Imperfect Information, 71:3 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 395 (1981). 
39 See Cao, supra note 38, at 853–57; Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 38, at 393. 
40 See Tiebout, supra note 37; see also JOSH SILVER & ARCHANA PRADHAN, NATIONAL 
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, WHY BRANCH CLOSURES ARE BAD FOR 
COMMUNITIES 2 (Apr. 2012) (explaining that during the Great Recession, “bank and credit 
union branches increased by 1,000 in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods while 
decreasing by 530 in low-and moderate-income neighborhoods and branches increased in 
predominately white neighborhoods by 598 while decreasing by 186 in minority neighbor-
hoods where more than 50 percent of the residents are minority”). 
41 See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Has 
Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217, 266–67 
(2005) (explaining the high transaction costs associated with lending to marginal borrowers 
that preclude traditional banks from lending). 
42 See Cao, supra note 38, at 856. 
43 See id. 
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may be reluctant to provide start-up capital to them.44 Third, individuals 
residing in racially identified and economically marginalized communities 
may lack the resources to fully understand their credit or financial options. 
If creditworthy individuals living in historically, or currently, disinvested 
neighborhoods are unaware of financial options outside of their neighbor-
hoods, because traditional banking institutions do not have a significant 
presence there, they may self-limit their lending or financing options. 
Even if individuals begin to improve their economic circumstances, if 
their mobility is restricted, because of discriminatory housing practices or 
a lack of affordable options in more lucrative neighborhoods, then they are 
still geographically and economically isolated from mainstream markets. 
An individual may also have familial connections in his or her neighbor-
hood that that dissuade him or her from moving. Further, even as econom-
ic conditions improve in a space, previously racially identified (and eco-
nomically marginalized as a result of that designation), the connotative 
discourses,45 which give that geographic space its social signifiers, can 
still perpetuate a narrative about that community that designates it as a bad 
investment. Thus, mainstream banks may not locate there, productive high 
paying industries may continue to resist establishing offices there, and white 
or wealthier residents may not want to move there.46 The geographic loca-
tion in which an individual resides, therefore, can limit his or her access to 
mainstream market forces even as that individual’s economic circumstances 
improve and economic conditions in the neighborhood progress.47 
Most importantly, these spatial dynamics of economic marginalization 
can also affect an individual’s ability to access social networks that might 
lead to greater economic empowerment. The term social capital reflects the 
sociologically demonstrated truth that individuals’ social networks can have 
economic value.48 A socially well-connected individual has more opportuni-
ties to connect to networks that lead to greater economic opportunities. 
Scholars have distinguished “bonding social capital” from “bridging social 
capital.”49 Bonding social capital refers to closely knit networks among 
                                                 
44 Susan Jones, Supporting Urban Entrepreneurs: Law, Policy and the Role of 
Lawyers in Small Business Development, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 71, 87–88 (2007) 
(explaining that women and minority entrepreneurs are not part of the old boy or new 
entrepreneur networks that characterize venture capital and angel investing). 
45 See, e.g., LEFEBVRE, supra note 12, at 56; Boddie, supra note 26. 
46 See Ford, Boundaries of Race, supra note 13, at 1851–52. 
47 See id. 
48 See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 18–20 (2000) (asserting that individuals’ abilities to develop positive 
economic and social networks is largely a result of the geographic spaces they inhabit). 
49 See id. at 22. 
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people who are familiar with one another based upon face-to-face interac-
tions in the same geographic area or through racial, ethnic, gender, or class 
ties.50 Bridging social capital indicates a form of networking that enables in-
dividuals to connect with broader social networks outside of their immediate 
geographic, familial, or friendship networks.51 Some neighborhood effects 
scholars argue that neighborhoods plagued by concentrated poverty, racial 
segregation, and geographic isolation from mainstream markets preclude in-
dividuals from developing the bridging social networks necessary to connect 
to opportunity.52 Individuals who may be promising entrepreneurs, or who 
are creditworthy based upon their credit scores, may still be geographically 
isolated from the kind of positive social networks that will lead to financing 
opportunities.53 New online cyberfinancing networks hold the potential to 
help such individuals overcome their isolation, yet these industries do not cur-
rently operate, and are not currently regulated, to advance this goal. This his-
tory of economic marginalization in the United States should inform ap-
proaches to regulating new cyberfinancing markets. 
B. Informal and Extra-Legal Responses to Spatial and Economic Marginality 
In light of this isolation, certain groups developed alternative informal, 
face-to-face, peer-to-peer, financing networks. Rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs) have long been used by immigrant and ethnic groups 
in the United States to create savings, to pay for small-scale personal expens-
es, or to finance micro-entrepreneurial activity.54 Trinidadian immigrants call 
such mechanisms a sou-sou;55 Mexicans, the tanda;56 West Africans, the 
esusu; Japanese, the tanomoshi; Chinese, the Hui; Koreans, the gae; Fili-
pinos, the Hulagan; and Vietnamese, the Bui.57 Through peer financing, 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See generally William Julius Wilson, Why Both Social Structure and Culture Mat-
ter in a Holistic Analysis of Inner-City Poverty, 629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 200, 206 (2010) (arguing that neighborhood concentrated poverty increases the 
likelihood of social isolation). 
53 See discussion infra Part I.D. 
54 See Cao, supra note 38, at 884–92 (providing a history of ROSCAs in the United States). 
55 Ralph Holcomb, Sou Sou Banking in Trinidad: Example of an Informal Mutual Aid 
Society (on file with author). 
56 See ROSALBA GAMA, DELMA MEDRANO & LUIS MEDRANO, TANDAS & CUNDINAS: 
MEXICAN AMERICAN & LATINO AMERICAN ROTATING CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS IN CALIFORNIA, 
http://www.anthro.uci.edu/html/Programs/Anthro_Money/Tandas.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
57 See Isao Fujimoto & Gerardo Sandoval, Tapping into California’s Central Valley’s 
Hidden Wealth: It’s Rich Cultural Capital, 9 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 119, 131 
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individuals informally come together to make regular cyclical contribu-
tions to a common fund, the balance of which is then given as a lump sum 
to one member in each cycle.58 Participants often do not invest these funds 
in a formal bank, rather the funds are held by members of the group and 
then distributed amongst group members. These forms of peer savings and 
lending rely on trust among members of the same geographic, racial, or 
ethnic group to serve as a form of collateral.59 Individuals must trust that 
other group members will repay their loans so that there is sufficient mon-
ey in the pot for their own loans. ROSCAs, therefore, are manifestations 
of bonding social capital, whereby a tightly knit group of individuals trust 
each other enough to develop an economic alternative to their geographic, 
social, racial, ethnic, and economic isolation. ROSCAs also serve a com-
munity building function as members meet through face-to-face interac-
tions and are able to vouch for the credit- or trust-worthiness of a particu-
lar member because of their friendship with, or history of face-to-face 
interactions with, that member.60 This pooling of resources between tight-
ly knit groups serves as a form of community economic development for 
economically marginalized groups.61 
Community norms and reputational sanctions also substitute for regu-
lation as a form of censure for failure to repay.62 Additionally, each partic-
ipant in a rotating savings and credit association is both a lender and bor-
rower during the life cycle of the ROSCA.63 This feature of the ROSCA 
aligns the incentives of borrowers and lenders in a manner that is different 
from the incentive structures in more traditional credit markets—where lend-
ers are commercial banks with profit maximization concerns and borrowers 
are individuals in need of credit or capital to fund activities. The ROSCA’s 
incentive structure “is one that [in theory] maximizes group and individual 
welfare while minimizing the possibility of defection and exploitation, as 
well as other forms of abuse.”64 In Looking at Communities and Markets, 
                                                                                                                         
(2007); see also Barack D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic 
Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006). 
58 HARI SRINIVAS, ROSCAS: THE MUTUALITY OF CREDIT: ROTATING CREDIT AND 
SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS, http://www.gdrc.org/icm/suppliers/rosca.html (last visited Mar. 
23, 2013); see also Cao, supra note 38, at 877. 
59 See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Has 
Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217, 268 
(2005) (describing solidarity circles). 
60 See id. at 221. 
61 See, e.g., Cao, supra note 38, at 875. 
62 See id. at 882–84. 
63 See id. at 849 (“[A] rotating credit association functions on the basis of aggregation of 
interests between borrowers and lenders, precisely because the lender is the borrower.”). 
64 Id. 
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legal scholar Lan Cao argues that ROSCAs can help mainstream banks 
overcome the information asymmetries and transaction costs that might 
preclude them from lending to risky borrowers in marginal communities.65 
Cao asserts that the community norms that regulate ROSCAs are reliable, 
and that states, and presumably the federal government, should defer to 
these norms and not attempt to regulate these financial transactions.66 Her 
analysis of ROSCAs presents an optimistic assessment of the social dy-
namics among members of ROSCAs. 
While face-to-face, peer-to-peer financing can be a positive form of 
bonding social capital, it can also be exploitative.67 Studies of the dynamics 
of ROSCAs in international developing economies often reveal that group 
members can use exploitative tactics to ensure that members repay.68 The 
trust and community norms that substitute for regulation can also surmount 
to undue peer pressure. Further, ROSCAs and informal peer lending rarely 
lead to bridging social capital, whereby economically marginal and geo-
graphically isolated groups connect to broader economic and social net-
works that lead to greater economic opportunities. However, ROSCAs do 
create an alternative market space in which members of historically margin-
alized groups can obtain limited financing. 
C. The Formalization of Peer Financing Through Microfinance 
CED69 lawyers and practitioners in the United States sought to formal-
ize ROSCAs and face-to-face peer lending through the development of 
non-profit, community-based, microfinance organizations. These organi-
zations provide financing to small and start-up American microenterprises. 
In the United States, the term microenterprise usually describes “any type 
of business that has fewer than five employees and is small enough to 
benefit from loans of under $35,000.”70 Thus, not every small business is a 
microenterprise; some start-ups require significantly greater initial investment 
                                                 
65 See id. at 885–89. 
66 See id. at 906–09. 
67 See Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 254–56. 
68 See id. at 255–56. 
69 See Cummings, supra note 17, at 906 (explaining that U.S.-based CED efforts are 
spearheaded by non-profit organizations that receive public and private subsidies to 
stimulate economic development in disadvantaged areas to benefit poor residents). 
70 Susan R. Jones & Amanda Spratley, How Microenterprise Contributes to CED in 
BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOR 
ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 380 (ABA 2009) (quoting Association for 
Enterprise Opportunity, Microenterprise Development in the United States: An Overview, 
Microenterprise Fact Sheet Series, 1 (2000), http://fieldus.org/publications/fact_sheet1.pdf). 
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capital than microfinance provides and other small businesses have more 
than five employees and substantial revenues and profits. The popularity 
of microfinance as an antidote to poverty and market failure in the United 
States increased with the Grameen Bank’s (the Bank’s) success with mi-
crolending to low-income, rural, women in the developing world.71 
Founded in 1983 in Bangladesh, by 2006 Nobel Prize winner Muhammed 
Yunus, the Bank has had significant success in uncollateralized microlend-
ing in developing countries.72 The Bank is a borrowers’ cooperative73 that 
makes small, unsecured loans often without requiring formal collateral, for-
mal legal instruments, group guarantees, or joint liability for defaults.74 The 
interest rate on all loans is sixteen percent and the loans are generally re-
paid by borrowers in small increments over the course of a year or less.75 
Currently, approximately ninety-six percent of the Bank’s loans are repaid 
by microborrowers.76 
The Bank formalizes aspects of the informal ROSCA model by estab-
lishing branches in low-income communities and requiring all borrowers to 
be organized into small, homogenous, five-member “solidarity groups.”77 
These groups are the mechanisms through which the bank disburses loans. 
Before loans are disbursed to any one member of the group, all group mem-
bers must attend a one or two-week-long training session in which they 
learn the Bank’s lending rules as well as how to run a microenterprise.78 
                                                 
71 See, e.g., Lewis D. Solomon, Microenterprise: Human Reconstruction in America’s Inner 
Cities, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 195 (1992); Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 223–24. 
72 See Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 194–95. Note that Muhammad Yunus departed 
from the Grameen Bank on May 15, 2011. See, e.g., A Letter Addressed to Grameen 
Bank Members from Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus on the Occasion of His 
Departure from Grameen Bank, GRAMEEN COMMC’NS (May 15, 2011), http://grameen-in
fo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1043. 
73 See Solomon, supra note 71, at 195 (“[B]orrowers owning 75% and the govern-
ment owning the remainder of the ... shares.”). 
74 See, e.g., Credit Delivery System, GRAMEEN COMMC’NS, http://www.grameen-info.org/in
dex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=169 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
75 See id. 
76 Bank Monthly Update in USD, GRAMEEN COMMC’NS, http://www.grameen-info.org/in
dex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=453&Itemid=527 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
77 See, e.g., GRAMEEN COMMC’NS, supra note 74; Solomon, supra note 71, at 196. 
78 The Women’s Self-Employment Project (WSEP) incorporated in 1986 was one of the 
first U.S., non-profit, organizations to adopt the Grameen model. During the organization’s 
years of operation it was a substantial source of capital and training for low-income, 
predominately African-American women microentrepreneurs. See Solomon, supra note 71, at 
202–03. However, WSEP was a subsidiary of the famous Chicago-based ShoreBank, a 
community bank founded in 1973, to revitalize disinvested and redlined black neighborhoods. 
The bank was profitable until the foreclosure crisis and the Great Recession when it failed. As 
a result, WSEP also folded. See, e.g., Becky Yerak, Chicago’s ShoreBank Fails, Is Bought by 
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These training sessions emphasize and implement the Bank’s “Sixteen De-
cisions”—a social development agenda that requires borrowers to engage in 
positive healthy behaviors that promote self-sufficiency, but also positive 
community development.79 The solidarity groups and the sixteen decisions 
are the community-norm generation mechanisms that substitute for collat-
eral and formal laws for failure to repay.80 While the solidarity group does 
not guarantee the loans extended to members, another member cannot re-
ceive their disbursement until the first lender repays—thus, giving all 
group members an incentive to enforce one another’s repayment.81 Fur-
ther, because the Bank lends through groups, rather than individuals, it 
mitigates the transaction costs associated with making small loans to indi-
vidual borrowers. 
Inspired by the success of the Grameen model, some American micro-
finance institutions (MFIs) have adopted a similar structure and design.82 Pro-
ject Enterprise, based in New York City, is a non-profit MFI that initially 
served primarily low-income, minority women microentrepreneurs in NYC.83 
It subsequently expanded its operations to serve male and female low-
income, minority microentrepreneurs.84 It also collaborates with other estab-
lished national MFIs.85 ACCION USA (ACCION) is another American MFI 
that adapts the Grameen model in significant ways.86 It is the domestic 
                                                                                                                         
Investors, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2010, at 1, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010
-08-20/business/ct-biz-0821-shorebank-20100820_1_fdic-assets-david-vitale. 
79 See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 233. 
80 See id. at 225–30. 
81 See id. at 225. 
82 See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 71, at 202–06; Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 234–41. 
83 See About Us, PROJECT ENTERPRISE, http://www.projectenterprise.org/About/where
.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
84 See Mission & History, PROJECT ENTERPRISE, http://www.projectenterprise.org/About
/mission.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
85 Project Enterprise works primarily in Upper Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, and the 
Bronx. Ninety-nine percent of the businesses PE serves are minority-owned, eighty-eight percent 
are African-American or Caribbean-American owned, and fifty-six percent are owned by 
women. See About Us,  PROJECT ENTERPRISE, supra note 83; Interview with Catherine Barnett, 
Executive Director, Project Enterprise in NY, NY (Jul. 18, 2011). The Grameen Foundation is a 
U.S.-based 501(c)(3) non-profit microfinance institution based upon the Grameen Bank model. 
It is a separate organization with an independent board and staff. See, e.g., Frequently Asked 
Questions, GRAMEEN FOUNDATION, http://grameenfoundation.org/faq#whatisgf (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013). In the United States, the Grameen Foundation works with partner microfinance 
institutions such as Project Enterprise. See, e.g., United States, GRAMEEN FOUNDATION, http://
grameenfoundation.org/americas/united-states (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
86 ACCION’s active clients are sixty-one percent Hispanic or Latino, twenty-seven 
percent African-American, and forty percent female. See, e.g., Our Microloan Borrowers, 
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American arm of ACCION International, a global microfinance organiza-
tion.87 In total, ACCION provides seventy-five percent of microloan ser-
vices in the United States.88 It funds borrowers with credit scores of 525 and 
above, a lower minimum credit score than most mainstream American fi-
nancial institutions require.89 ACCION requires borrowers to obtain asset-
based collateral or guarantees for their loans.90 It does not use a group lend-
ing or collateralization model, but it encourages group-administered finan-
cial education and refers borrowers to a network of community-based tech-
nical assistance providers.91 ACCION’s loan amounts, which range from 
$700 to $50,000 per loan with an average loan amount of $5100, are gener-
ally larger than that of Grameen and other international microfinance insti-
tutions.92 ACCION’s loan terms range from six to sixty months; its interest 
rates, which range from eight to fifteen percent, are also generally lower than 
those of less established international microfinance institutions.93 ACCION’s 
borrowers repay their loans more than eighty-nine percent of the time.94 
ACCION and similar American MFIs95 represent a trend in U.S. mi-
crofinance whereby American MFIs are quasi-financial institutions that 
intermediate between risky, marginal borrowers and mainstream markets 
for credit and capital. These institutions adopt some of the features of 
ROSCAs, but they also utilize more traditional financial measures to de-
termine creditworthiness. While Grameen delegates the selection of bor-
rowers, the determination of borrowers’ creditworthiness, and peer financial 
                                                                                                                         
ACCION USA, http://www.accionusa.org/home/support-accion/learn/meet-our-borrowers
.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
87 See, e.g., Microfinance FAQ, ACCION USA, http://www.accionusa.org/home/sup
port-accion/about-accion/microfinance-faq.aspx#2 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
88 Id. 
89 ACCION USA also only accepts borrowers who have not declared bankruptcy in the 
past twelve months or foreclosure in the past twenty-four months. Borrowers also may not 
have any late mortgage or rent payments in the last twelve months. Borrowers must be current 
on all bills and not have more than $3000 in past due debt because of extenuating circumstan-
ces. See, e.g., Basic Loan Requirements, ACCION USA, http://www.accionusa.org/home/small
-business-loans/about-our-loans/general-loan-requirements.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
90 See Group vs. Individual Lending, ACCION USA, http://www.accionusa.org/home
/support-accion/learn/microlending-in-the-united-states.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
91 See Microfinance FAQs, ACCION USA, http://www.accionusa.org/home/support-ac
cion/about-accion/microfinance-faq.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 The Association for Enterprise Opportunity (AEO) is also a national membership or-
ganization for microfinance and microbusiness development institutions in the United States. 
See, e.g., About AEO, ASS’N FOR ENTERPRISE OPPORTUNITY (May 22, 2009), http://www.aeo
works.org/index.php/site/page/category/about_aeo/. 
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education to the solidarity group, many U.S. microfinance institutions retain 
these functions.96 Retaining these due diligence and financial education fea-
tures helps the MFIs mitigate financial risks, but it is also extremely costly 
for them. Thus, a typical for-profit mainstream financial institution would 
not want to incur the costs associated with a small $2000 loan. The loan 
amounts, and the interest earned on them are not substantial enough to cover 
these retained due diligence costs. Consequently, American MFIs are often 
non-profits that rely on charitable contributions, and social investments 
from individuals, corporations and foundations to cover these costs.97 
The non-profit form permits the microfinance organizations to provide 
these services, which are consistent with the non-profit forms’ charitable 
purposes, and it enables these MFIs to obtain tax-deductible contributions 
to cover their costs. Further, the federal and state monitoring that accom-
panies the process of non-profit formation and maintenance helps to en-
sure that the MFIs administer funds ethically. The non-profit form also 
helps formalize the process of peer financing by minimizing the potential 
for abuse between group members in unregulated ROSCAs or peer financ-
ing circles. However, the formalization of peer financing through non-
profits also increases borrowers’ transaction costs over and above the costs 
associated with obtaining a loan from a mainstream lender, or a fringe fi-
nancial services institution.98 The training that domestic non-profit organi-
zations provide, as precondition of receiving financing, is often more sub-
stantial than what international microfinance institutions or informal 
ROSCAs provide. Consequently, U.S. microborrowers participating in 
domestic microfinance programs have to attend several meetings.99 This 
aspect of non-profit microfinance can dissuade low-income individuals, for 
whom time is often scarce, from participating in such programs. Microbor-
rowers may prefer to transact with fringe financial institutions, or the new 
cyberfinancing networks that do not impose these transaction costs.100 
The above-described features of domestic microfinance also limit the 
potential sources of capital and investment that can be accessed to pro-
mote U.S. microenterprise. First, contributors to American MFIs must ei-
ther have social motivations or desire a tax-exemption or tax credits to in-
vest in these endeavors.101 U.S. microfinance institutions also have to 
                                                 
96 See Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 238–39. 
97 See Microfinance FAQs, supra note 91. 
98 See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 231. 
99 See id. at 238–39. 
100 See, e.g., Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 7, at 496; Barnett, supra note 85. 
101 See Davis & Gelpern, supra note 7, at 1238 (explaining the legal features of U.S. 
non-profit microfinance institutions with which donors have to comply). 
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compete with international microfinance institutions to obtain donors. 
Some donors may perceive that smaller contributions can make a greater 
contribution in international microfinance markets than in American mar-
kets.102 Second, in domestic American microfinance, individual lenders also 
do not make a direct connection with potential borrowers; rather, they inter-
act and contract with intermediating non-profit organizations in the hope 
that those organizations will make legitimate loans and provide valuable 
training to U.S. microentrepreneurs. Third, prospective borrowers have to 
be aware of existing MFIs in order to access funds. Prospective borrowers 
are more likely to be aware of microfinance institutions that have a geo-
graphic presence in their neighborhoods. Thus, while American MFIs con-
nect economically marginal and geographically isolated individuals to some 
sources of credit that might not otherwise be available, they do not connect 
participants to substantially new markets or social networks outside of their 
geographic areas, demographic profiles, or friendship networks. Lastly, the 
existing framework of offline American microfinance does not reach the 
lowest income borrowers nor does it provide the kind of capital needed to 
help microentrepreneurs grow and sustain their businesses over time.103 The 
lowest income borrowers either cannot qualify for microfinance programs 
or they do not connect with microfinancing institutions.104 Further, the 
amount of money obtained by U.S. microentrepreneurs from U.S. micro-
finance institutions is not enough to sustain a microenterprise as it grows and 
navigates an increasingly competitive and complex American market.105 
Cyberfinancing, as currently operated, does not substantially overcome these 
shortcomings of domestic microfinance. 
D. Legal Responses to Spatial and Economic Marginality 
While domestic peer financing and microfinance developed somewhat in-
dependently of formal law, Congress did enact several laws to stimulate private 
investment and microenterprise in historically disadvantaged communities. 
                                                 
102 Press Release, Kiva.Org, Kiva Launches Online Microfinance in the United States 
(June 10, 2009), available at http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/kiva-launches-on 
line-microfinance-in-the-united-states-1222313.htm (“Most people think of microfinance as 
something that helps people in the developing world alone, but the impact of microfinance can 
be felt in any community that supports creative, industrious entrepreneurs.”). 
103 See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 270; Louise A. Howells, The Dimensions 
of Microenterprise: A Critical Look at Microenterprise as a Tool to Alleviate Poverty, 9 
J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 161, 171 (2000). 
104 See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 270; Louise A. Howells, supra note 103, at 171. 
105 See Dyal-Chand, supra note 59, at 270; Louise A. Howells, supra note 103, at 171. 
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Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)106 in 1977 to 
end the practice of “redlining” and to stimulate private bank investment in 
economically marginalized areas.107 The CRA also spurred private invest-
ment in domestic microfinance when the CRA regulations were revised in 
1995,108 and when the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund 
(CDFI Fund) was created in 1994.109 The CRA gives federally insured de-
pository institutions a “continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet 
the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered, in-
cluding low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.”110 Covered banks are 
encouraged to fulfill their CRA obligations in a manner “consistent with the 
safe and sound operation of such institutions.”111 This requirement, as inter-
preted and implemented by bank regulators, encourages banks not only to end 
redlining practices, but also to affirmatively seek opportunities to lend in for-
mally redlined low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.112 
The CRA’s definition of low- to moderate-income communities does 
not specifically take race into account.113 Instead, it encourages banks to 
remedy the geographic and economic isolation caused by historical racism 
by meeting the credit needs of low- to moderate-income communities with-
in a bank’s “assessment areas.”114 The term “assessment area” includes the 
geographic locations in which the bank has its “main office, its branches, 
and its deposit-taking ATMs, as well as the surrounding geographies in 
which the bank has originated or purchased a substantial portion of its 
loans.115 The CRA is separate from, but works in conjunction with, other 
anti-discrimination laws and consumer protection laws. The CRA is en-
forced by four federal bank regulators.116 The regulators review a bank’s 
                                                 
106 See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2000). 
107 Marsico, Community Reinvestment Act, supra note 27, at 403–14. 
108 Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. § 22,156, 22,157 (May 4, 
1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 203, 228, 345, 563e). 
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determination of its assessment areas,117 and issue public written reports 
that rate banks’ compliance with their CRA obligations.118 The regulators 
consider a bank’s CRA rating when determining whether to grant a bank’s 
application to “obtain a charter, obtain deposit insurance, establish a 
branch, relocate a home office or branch, merge with another bank, or ob-
tain the assets or assume the liabilities of another bank.”119 A negative 
CRA rating can cause regulators to deny a bank permission to engage in 
these activities. Any member of the public can participate in the public 
comment process and oppose any bank’s application on the basis of its 
CRA ratings.120 
The CDFI Fund was created in 1994 as an arm of the U.S. Treasury De-
partment, to promote economic revitalization and community development 
through investment in, and assistance to, CDFIs.121 CDFIs are privately 
owned financial intermediaries established to advance community economic 
development in low-income and historically disadvantaged communities in 
the United States.122 CDFIs provide financial services to microenterprises, 
non-profit organizations, commercial real estate development projects, 
affordable housing, and other community development projects in histori-
cally disinvested areas.123 The CDFI Fund directly invests in, supports, 
and trains CDFIs.124 It also administers the New Markets Tax Credit Pro-
gram (NMTC Program), which provides tax credits to individual and cor-
porate investors who make equity investments in specialized financial in-
stitutions called Community Development Entities (CDEs).125 CDEs provide 
investment capital to low-income communities and include members of 
such communities on their governing boards.126 Many CDFIs seek CDE 
certification to attract private investment for microfinance and other com-
munity development activities. In 1995, revised CRA regulations explicit-
ly recognized loans and investments made by regulated private banks in 
CDFIs as qualified CRA activities.127 By investing in CDFIs that screen 
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microfinance institutions, which ultimately screen borrowers, private 
banks reduce the transaction costs associated with investing in marginal 
communities. They can also obtain a favorable CRA rating from these ac-
tivities, which helps them maximize profits in other aspects of their busi-
ness. This confluence of federal laws and regulations helped stimulate pri-
vate sector investment in microfinance and community development. 
However, the CRA, the CDFI, and the NMTC are all examples of fed-
eral legislation designed to stimulate economic development in communi-
ties that are defined geographically—the neighborhood, low- and moder-
ate-income areas, the metropolitan statistical area, the qualified census 
tract, and the assessment area, amongst other designations. Yet, as globali-
zation and technology operate to disentangle markets from geographic 
boundaries, some of the traditional legal structures and community devel-
opment practices that remedy prior market failures and facilitate new eco-
nomic development may need to be reexamined, or at least applied in new 
contexts. The geographic emphasis of these laws is still necessary, but, 
perhaps no longer sufficient. A diverse range of financial institutions, in 
complex economic relationships, now provide banking and financial ser-
vices. With the advent of the Internet and interactive websites, increasing-
ly, markets and economic opportunities are less tied to local geographic 
boundaries. Geography is not irrelevant and globalization and technology 
still have implications for local markets, but new banking and economic 
development opportunities exist in cyberspace, rather than in geographic 
space. Our community economic development laws and economic justice 
incentives must respond to this increasing complexity. 
E. Modernizing the Community Reinvestment Act to Respond to Changes 
in the Financial Services Delivery System 
The recent subprime mortgage debacle exemplifies how community 
economic development laws and incentives need to be modernized128 and 
expanded to respond to changing economic conditions. While the subprime 
mortgage crisis was not caused by innovations in cyberspace, it demon-
strates that CRA’s protections did not keep pace with significant changes in 
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the financial services industry spurred by bank deregulation and capital 
market innovations. This regulatory slippage had a negative impact on the 
mortgage industry in general, but also on and low-income, minority, eco-
nomically marginal and geographically isolated communities, in particular. 
When the CRA was initially enacted, its covered depository institutions 
originated most of the mortgages in the United States, and held most house-
hold savings in the United States.129 At that time, individuals’ also conduct-
ed most of their banking through local bank branches. Fixed-rate, prime, 
thirty-year mortgages were also the norm for most Americans. 
In the 1980s, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA),130 the Alternative Mortgage Transaction 
Parity Act of 1982 (AMTPA),131 and their accompanying implementing 
regulations deregulated the mortgage industry.132 DIDMCA preempted 
state interest rate caps on mortgages.133 The AMTPA enabled lenders to 
offer adjustable rate mortgages.134 This deregulation enabled mortgage 
companies to offer more complex products with complicated terms, such 
as adjustable rate mortgages with teaser rates, mortgages with balloon 
payments, and mortgages containing higher interest rates and fees.135 Fur-
ther, in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), also known as the 
“Financial Services Modernization Act,” made significant changes to the 
financial services industry, eliminating many regulatory barriers that pre-
vented banks, securities firms, and insurance companies from affiliat-
ing.136 The GLBA allowed banks, securities firms, and insurance compa-
nies to consolidate within a financial holding company.137 These financial 
holding companies provided a range of financial services at lower costs.138 
This deregulation and other changes in the financial services industry led 
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to a proliferation of mortgage companies that offered a range of compli-
cated financial products that were not regulated by the CRA. While legis-
lators sought to repeal the CRA in their deliberations over the GBLA, the 
CRA was maintained although modified.139 Applications by financial hold-
ing companies and national banks seeking new financial services or to ac-
quire new companies must be denied where any of the holding companies’ 
banks or thrifts has a low CRA rating.140 However, “where a parent com-
pany’s depository institutions all have CRA ratings of at least satisfactory, 
such applications cannot be denied on CRA grounds.”141 The GLBA also 
relaxed the CRA burden on mid-sized banks.142 These changes led to lax 
enforcement of CRA protections and left the activities of some mortgage 
companies outside of the regulatory ambit of the CRA.143 This failure to 
modernize and expand CRA’s protections created a regulatory vacuum 
that contributed to the crisis.144 Unscrupulous mortgage brokers originated 
subprime mortgages with problematic terms to unwitting borrowers and 
engaged in predatory lending in the same communities once previously 
redlined.145 Studies have shown that subprime lenders often engaged in 
“reverse redlining”— targeting predatory and subprime loans with prob-
lematic terms towards minority borrowers, who may not qualify for prime 
loans or who are inexperienced in mortgage markets.146 Other studies re-
veal that subprime and predatory lenders targeted some minority borrowers 
who otherwise would have qualified for prime loans.147 While risky loans 
were initially marketed primarily to low-income, minority communities, 
and to seniors, the failure to regulate these practices legitimized irrespon-
sible lending practices. Consequently, a growing number of institutions 
offered these products to individuals living outside of vulnerable, low-
income, minority communities, and a growing number of individuals sought 
                                                 
139 See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engle & Patricia McCoy, The CRA Implications of Preda-
tory Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1574 (2002). 
140 See id. at 1575. 
141 See id. 
142 See Brescia, CRA for the 21st Century, supra note 113, at 6. 
143 See id. at 289. 
144 See John Moon, CRA Modernization and Impact Investments, supra note 128, at 50–54. 
145 See id. 
146 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society 
Needs Law, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 159–60 (2012). 
147 See, e.g., Brescia, Capital in Chaos, supra note 132, at 285; Engle & McCoy, 
supra note 139, at 1583–84; Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders 
Responsible for the Rise in Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 
1169, 1176 (2008); Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the Public Interest, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 87, 119 (2011). 
334 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:309 
or used these products to obtain new sources of income and equity. Thus, 
relatively few subprime loans even qualified for CRA credit, either be-
cause they “were made outside of CRA assessment areas, or because they 
were made to higher-income borrowers.”148 A study conducted by the U.S. 
Federal Reserve found that “only 6% of all higher-priced loans in 2006 
[the height of the subprime mortgage crisis] were made by CRA-covered 
institutions or their affiliates to lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods 
in their assessment areas.”149 
Mainstream banks could indirectly finance subprime lending through 
relationships with non-affiliated financial institutions not covered by 
CRA. Further, “census tracts served disproportionately by CRA-covered 
lenders had less risky loans and lower delinquency rates than those served 
disproportionately by non-CRA lenders.”150 Despite these facts, many 
have identified the CRA as the primary or sole cause of subprime and 
predatory lending in the United States.151 Instead, the subprime mortgage 
catastrophe demonstrates that CRA’s protections did not keep pace with 
significant changes in the financial services industry spurred by bank de-
regulation and capital market innovations. Deregulation in the securities 
and financial services industries also increased the securitization of sub-
prime mortgages. Securitization created increased demand for subprime 
products that could be sold to investors.152 The majority of originators, and 
the majority of special purpose vehicles that securitized subprime-
mortgage products, were not CRA covered depository institutions. These 
organizations conducted their financial activities outside the ambit of CRA 
regulators. These entities were, thus, given free rein to engage in irresponsible 
lending practices, and to market problematic products to individuals and 
communities that were vulnerable as a result of their economic, social or 
geographic status. This regulatory slippage also created market opportuni-
ties for fringe financial institutions153 and unscrupulous lenders to locate 
in, and target, low-income minority neighborhoods.154 These institutions 
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predominated in low-income, minority communities, because of those 
communities’ histories of disinvestment and their lack of legitimate finan-
cial alternatives.155 While these fringe banking156 institutions’ ultimately 
raise customers’ transaction costs in the long-run, in the short-term, they 
reduce the transaction costs associated with obtaining cash. Thus, unregu-
lated, fringe financial services are initially efficient for all involved. Low-
income, minority, and geographically isolated borrowers may prefer to 
transact with fringe financial institutions because they can obtain cash 
quickly without having to endure credit checks, training or other financial 
and non-financial requirements of mainstream financial institutions and 
microfinance agencies.157 Yet, fringe financial services markets are also 
characterized by opportunism and abuses of trust.158 A lack of consistent 
national regulations to facilitate legitimate lending in low-income commu-
nities and to curb fraudulent, unfair, and deceptive practices helped to cre-
ate an alternative market space that undermined trust and limited access to 
legitimate mainstream markets. This example of regulatory drift demon-
strates that a lack of regulation can lead markets to develop in dysfunc-
tional ways that perpetuate existing market failures and replicate existing 
social allocations of power. Problematic distributive outcomes in markets 
can occur when law is inattentive to the relationship between communities 
and markets. Hence, the United States may also need to modernize the CRA 
to regulate new developments in the financial services delivery system, such 
as new online cyberfinancing, and to ensure distributive justice in these 
emerging markets. 
II. CYBERFINANCING 2.0: COMMUNITIES, MARKETS AND LAW REVISITED 
A. Online Peer-to-Peer Lending 2.0 
Online P2P lending describes interactive websites that allow borrowers 
and lenders to transact with one another online without the traditional in-
volvement of a mainstream financial institution.159 Some scholars call P2P 
lending an example of continued disintermediation in lending transactions, 
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suggesting that borrowers and lenders can increasingly engage in lending 
transactions without the intermediating role of a bank or financial institu-
tion.160 Yet, as this Section explains, while P2P lending platforms eliminate 
some of the traditional intermediating functions of banks, they still intermedi-
ate, albeit in a unique way. These platforms not only intermediate differently 
from traditional banks, but they also intermediate differently than traditional 
microfinance institutions or ROSCAs. 
The three most popular P2P lending platforms in the United States are 
Prosper.com (Prosper), Lending Club.com (Lending Club) and Kiva.org 
(Kiva).161 Prosper and Lending Club are P2P lending platforms owned by 
two different for-profit companies. Kiva is a P2P microlending platform, 
owned by a non-profit organization, which enables lenders to make inter-
est-free loans to microentrepreneurs throughout the globe.162 The for-
profit lending platforms primarily facilitate unsecured loans between bor-
rowers and lenders. The non-profit platform facilitates domestic and inter-
national microlending. These platforms help borrowers and lenders, identi-
fy each other, connect, lend, and borrow online. They also enable users to 
connect across distance, class, race, gender, and ethnicity. 
Notably, online P2P lending increased in popularity, in the United States, 
along with more famous social networking sites such as Facebook and 
YouTube.163 P2P lending also became an increasingly important alternative 
source of consumer credit in the United States, as credit markets contract-
ed after the financial crisis and during the Great Recession.164 In 2009, for 
example, U.S. banks posted the sharpest declines in private lending since 
1942.165 In response, many borrowers turned to online P2P lending. When 
the for-profit P2P platforms were initially launched, they allowed borrow-
ers with lower credit scores than those required by mainstream financial 
institutions to publish loan requests on P2P lending sites.166 This enabled 
economically marginal and geographically isolated borrowers to obtain 
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loans on terms that were otherwise difficult for them to obtain through tra-
ditional or even fringe financial markets.167 
Yet, as the SEC began to regulate these websites,168 Prosper and Lend-
ing Club adopted higher minimum credit scores for qualifying borrowers. 
These requirements will operate to limit traditionally marginalized bor-
rowers’ access to these websites. This example shows how SEC regulation 
led the for-profit P2P lending sites to limit marginalized borrowers’ ac-
cess. It suggests that the United States should embrace a multi-agency and 
multidisciplinary approach to regulating P2P lending that balances the 
needs of both lenders and borrowers who participate on these sites. In Part 
III, this Article proposes such a regulatory structure. The following Sec-
tions describe and analyze the premiere for-profit and non-profit P2P lend-
ing platforms in the United States. Section 1 of Part II.A describes the for-
profit P2P lending process and the intermediary organizations that facili-
tate it. Section 1 of Part II.A also explains that U.S. regulators are increas-
ingly restricting economically marginal borrowers’ access to these web-
sites. Section 2 of Part II.A describes how the non-profit P2P microlend-
microlending platform, Kiva.org, intermediates in P2P microlending 
transactions online. It also outlines the advantages and disadvantages of 
the current model of non-profit P2P lending for geographically isolated 
and economically marginal borrowers. 
1. For-Profit Peer-to-Peer Lending 2.0 
Prosper and Lending Club have similar lending processes. Potential 
borrowers and lenders must register on the P2P lending platforms and 
provide basic information to the platforms “to determine their eligibility as 
a borrower or lender.”169 Prospective borrowers have more stringent re-
quirements for eligibility than prospective lenders. They must complete a 
loan application to determine their creditworthiness, and must now have 
minimum credit scores of “at least 640 for Prosper and 660 for Lending 
Club” to participate.170 Prosper and Lending Club then assign letter grades 
to help prospective lenders gauge borrowers’ creditworthiness.171 The let-
ter grades are based upon a combination of the borrower’s credit score, 
credit history, requested loan amount, and past delinquencies.172 Both 
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companies then post approved and rated loan requests for lenders to re-
view and select.173 Prospective lenders, however, are not evaluated for 
creditworthiness.174 They only have to provide identity verification and 
attest that they meet the platforms’, or various state regulators’, minimum 
asset requirements.175 
These platforms allow borrowers to develop, and publish online, once 
approved, personal narratives that provide non-financial information about 
the borrower and his or her loan request. Prospective lenders can view this 
information, in addition to standard financial information, when making 
lending decisions. Recent studies have shown that this narrative information 
can make a difference in lenders’ decision-making processes.176 Borrowers 
whose credit grades are poor will often “strategically provide identities”177 
in this narrative section. The identities that borrowers develop through these 
narratives can positively influence a lender’s decision to lend to a borrower 
with an otherwise poor credit rating.178 Thus, users on P2P lending plat-
forms may not know each other before meeting and connecting online, but 
they come to know a bit more about each other, in this cyberspace, through 
the information that the P2P lending platforms collect and publish. In mak-
ing their determinations, lenders can manually peruse individual loan re-
quests, develop portfolios based upon certain criteria, or use automated 
portfolio building tools offered by the platforms to make their selections.179 
The platforms also limit the aggregate amount that each lender can 
lend—up to $5 million dollars for Prosper and no more than ten percent of a 
lender’s total net worth for Lending Club. Both platforms provide partici-
pating lenders “a prorated share of any corresponding repayments of princi-
pal and interest on the loans they help fund.”180 These platforms, therefore, 
provide lenders returns on their investments.181 If the borrowers associated 
with the lenders’ investments fail to repay their loans, however, lenders will 
lose both their principal and interest investments.182 These platforms enable 
lenders to achieve higher returns on their investments.183 
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As of March 31, 2011 Prosper reported that lenders received average 
annualized returns exceeding 11 percent for loans originated since it 
completed registration with the SEC in July 2009, while Lending Club 
reported net annualized returns exceeding 9 percent for all loans since it 
issued its first loan in June 2007.184 
These returns exceeded those annual yields available on savings, money mar-
ket accounts, and certificates of deposit during the same period.185 
Borrowers use these platforms as alternative sources of credit.186 Bor-
rowers on these platforms are usually seeking “small unsecured loans for 
consumer purposes—such as consolidating debts, paying for home repairs, 
or financing personal, household or family purchases—or to a lesser ex-
tent for business purposes.”187 Some economically marginalized borrowers 
“for whom payday lending may have been the only option,” have turned to 
P2P markets to “consolidate their loans, pay off debts, and improve their 
credit scores.”188 The interest rates on P2P loans are often lower than those 
on traditional unsecured bank loans or credit cards.189 “As of March 31, 
2011, the annual percentage rate for a 3-year loan was as low as 6.9 per-
cent for Prosper and 6.8 percent for Lending Club, depending on the bor-
rower’s credit ratings or loan grades, while the average annual percentage 
rate for credit cards around that time was 14.7 percent.”190 While Prosper’s 
annual percentage rates can be as high as 35.6 percent and Lending Club’s 
can be as high as 25.4 percent, “Prosper reported that the average annual per-
centage rate for all 3-year loans since its inception was 20.6 percent, and 
Lending Club reported that the same average for its loans was 11.4 percent.”191 
A lender will usually invest in a number of different loans, and may 
invest in all or part of a given loan request, to diversify its portfolio of in-
vestments.192 Some lenders may give as little as $25 per loan.193 Notably, 
lenders on both platforms do not make loans directly to borrowers.194 
Thus, the platforms do intermediate between borrowers and lenders. When 
                                                 
184 Id. at 9. 
185 See id. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. at 10. 
188 See id. at 505 (citing Alexandra Todorova, Peer-to-Peer Lending Offers Solution for 
Strapped Consumers, SMARTMONEY (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.smartmoney.com/spend
/family-money/peer-to-peer-lending-offers-solution-for-strapped-consumers-2-1978). 
189 See id. at 9. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. at 10. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. at 13. 
340 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:309 
lenders choose borrowers through the P2P lending platforms, they pur-
chase payment-dependent notes from the platforms that correspond to the 
selected borrower loans.195 WebBank, an FDIC-insured Utah-chartered 
industrial bank, issues the loans to borrowers, and then sells and assigns 
the loans to the respective platforms in exchange for the principal amount 
that the platforms received from the sale of corresponding notes to the 
lenders.196 Thus, the WebBank originates the loans, but does not retain 
ownership of the loans. Instead, the WebBank transfers the loans and the 
risk of borrower nonpayment to the respective platforms.197 
The platforms now are registered with the SEC and sell their notes to 
lenders via prospectus.198 Those notes are the platforms’ obligations paya-
ble upon borrower repayment.199 “Accordingly, when the lender signals 
interest in a prospective borrower, and WebBank lends to the borrower, 
the platform permanently retains ownership of the borrower’s indebted-
ness. The platform then sells its debt instrument to the lender, who be-
comes a creditor of the platform not the borrower.”200 Prosper and Lend-
ing Club retain exclusive rights to service the loans, collect monthly 
payments from borrowers, and recover any delinquencies.201 They also 
determine when to turn over delinquent loans to third-party collection 
agencies.202 The platforms take a one percent servicing fee, amongst other 
fees, and then “credit each lender’s account with his or her share of the 
remaining funds.”203 For both companies, as of March 31, 2011, about two 
percent or less of the loans in their top three credit grades originated be-
tween the first half of 2010 had defaulted.204 
The P2P lending platforms described above provide a slightly more 
individualized way for lenders to identify prospective borrowers.205 As 
explained earlier, standard banks and lending institutions, including pay-
day lenders, use more “standardized underwriting procedures and risk pro-
filing algorithms”206 to determine borrowers’ creditworthiness and to guide 
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their lending decisions. Using these methods, “[b]orrowers with more stan-
dard risk profiles have better access to credit than those that fall outside of 
traditional parameters.”207 Thus, traditional standardized underwriting can 
lead to a credit rationing that precludes riskier or economically marginal 
borrowers, from receiving credit.208 While the P2P lending platforms’ con-
sideration of credit scores and determination of letter grades constitute a 
form of credit rationing, the platforms also collect, and allow borrowers to 
provide, other nonfinancial information as part of their customized loan list-
ing, such as what the loan will be used for, a borrower’s description of their 
financial situation, and an explanation of delinquencies, or a high-revolving 
credit balance.209 This additional information may help economically mar-
ginal borrowers whose economic indicators suggest credit risk convince in-
dividual lenders to consider them despite their economic risk factors.210 
Lenders also often fund more than one loan and aggregate loans. Conse-
quently, lenders may be willing to fund some riskier borrowers if that risk is 
offset by more standard borrowers. Thus, while online P2P lending does not 
eliminate the barriers to credit access that high-risk borrowers face, it can mit-
igate them by reducing the costs associated with lending transactions, and 
overcoming, in part, the geographic and social distance that precludes tradi-
tionally marginalized borrowers from participation in mainstream markets. 
For-profit online P2P lending platforms also expose economically mar-
ginal and geographically isolated borrowers to a broader selection of poten-
tial lenders than traditional microfinance institutions, or ROSCAs. Prospec-
tive lenders on Prosper and Lending Club are, generally, seeking to obtain 
better financial returns on their investments, than what might be available 
through other investment vehicles. As such, investors on these sites are not 
primarily motivated to assist low-income individuals or groups. Thus, eco-
nomically marginal borrowers participating on these sites are exposed to a 
broader social network of potential lenders than would be available through 
a community-based ROSCA or through microfinance institutions. Margin-
alized borrowers may also prefer to obtain small amounts of unsecured 
loans from individuals through P2P lending platforms; this is because they 
can escape the time-consuming and costly process of community meetings, 
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as well as the peer-pressure that characterizes participation in informal 
ROSCAs or formal microfinance institutions.211 
P2P lending platforms, therefore, provided borrowers with new sources 
of credit and investors with new opportunities to lend their capital, and di-
versify their investments, by reducing the transaction and information costs 
associated with lending through traditional financial institutions.212 Howev-
er, P2P lending platforms now only collect limited non-financial infor-
mation about borrowers and they do not facilitate the same level of face-
to-face interaction and trust-building as do ROSCAs and microfinance in-
stitutions. As a result, for-profit P2P lending institutions may not help bor-
rowers establish the tight social bonds and human capital development es-
sential to helping borrowers repay and develop their microenterprises. 
Another risk is that borrowers, who are inexperienced, may not be able to 
determine good credit terms. Further, ROSCAs and microfinance institu-
tions attempt somewhat to align the interests of borrowers and lenders by 
making individuals play both roles, or by requiring borrowers to attend 
financial and business education seminars that increase the likelihood of 
repayment. For-profit P2P lending portals do not require borrowers and 
lenders to align their interests, nor do they force borrowers and lenders to 
engage in repeat transactions. While this may lower the transaction costs 
for borrowers and lenders, it may also heighten the risks of non-payment 
or fraud in online transactions. 
P2P lending still represents an opportunity for geographically isolated 
and economically marginalized borrowers to access new sources of credit 
by connecting them more directly to new sources of funds. Yet, current 
U.S. regulation of P2P lending is restricting traditionally marginalized ac-
tors’ access to these markets. In response to some defaults, but also in re-
sponse to increased regulatory scrutiny, the leading platforms now require 
higher minimum credit scores for prospective borrowers, than they re-
quired when the platforms were first launched. These higher credit score 
requirements are designed to protect lenders because they connect lenders 
to less risky borrowers. While lenders do need protection in these markets, 
US regulators may need to create incentives that increase marginalized 
actors access without sacrificing the rights of lenders. 
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a. SEC Regulation of P2P Lending Restricts Marginalized 
Borrowers’ Access 
Given the novel and complex nature of P2P lending transactions, a 
number of federal and state agencies have responsibility for regulating these 
transactions.213 As scholars have noted, because WebBank, an FDIC-
insured institution, is involved in the process of intermediation, a number of 
federal banking and lending statutes apply to these transactions.214 Thus, 
lenders who might discriminate against low-income and geographically 
marginal borrowers based upon illegitimate criteria, such as race, gender 
or ethnic status, are prohibited from such activities by federal anti-
discrimination laws that pertain to lending transactions. Further, consumer 
protection statutes that apply to lending activities such as the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Fair Debt 
Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), the Electronic Funds Transfer Act 
(EFTA), and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) also 
apply to P2P lending transactions.215 These statutes, however, do not ad-
dress the geographic and economic barriers to credit access that often 
plague traditionally marginalized groups. Thus, the consumer and anti-
discrimination focus of existing lending laws are necessary, but are unlikely 
to address the economic, geographic, and social isolation that precludes 
many borrowers from participating in mainstream markets. 
Notably, the SEC has been the most aggressive agency in regulating 
P2P lending.216 This may explain the investor-protection emphasis in the 
U.S.’s current regulation of P2P lending. In 2008, the SEC issued a cease-
and-desist order against Prosper because it determined that the lending 
notes Prosper issued to investors constituted securities under federal secu-
rities laws.217 Since Prosper had not registered with the SEC prior to the 
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cease-and-desist order, the SEC determined that it was dealing unregistered 
securities in violation of sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act of 1933.218 
Notably, federal securities laws do not precisely define the term “securities,” 
yet based upon the Supreme Court’s precedents in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 
and Reves v. Ernst & Young, interpreting the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC 
determined that Prosper was trading unregistered securities and ordered Pros-
per to cease its activities.219 
In Howey, the Supreme Court devised a test to determine whether a 
particular transaction qualifies as an “investment contract,” or security, 
and held that “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person [i] in-
vests his money [ii] in a common enterprise and is led to expect [iii] prof-
its solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third-party,” constitutes an 
investment contract and is thus subject to U.S. securities regulation.220 The 
SEC determined that the payment-dependent notes issued to investors by 
Prosper satisfied all three elements of the Howey test and constituted an 
investment contract subject to securities regulation.221 Further, the SEC 
found that Prosper’s notes constituted securities under the tests established 
by the Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernest & Young.222 In Reves, the Su-
preme Court devised a list of factors to identify which notes do not constitute 
securities.223 Since the payment-dependent notes issued to lenders through 
Prosper did not qualify under any of the factors in the Reves list, the SEC 
also determined that Prosper’s notes were securities.224 Prosper shut down 
in 2008, in response to the SEC’s cease and desist order and resumed op-
eration on July 13, 2009 after filing a registration statement with the 
SEC.225 Lending Club then also shut down its notes operation in 2008 
pending registration with the SEC, “but it continued to make loans to bor-
rowers using its own funds.”226 Lending Club resumed its notes operation 
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in October 2008 and grew rapidly.227 As of March 31, 2011, Prosper and 
Lending Club facilitated about 63,000 unsecured, fixed-term, and fixed-
rate loans, totaling approximately $469 million, most of which were con-
sumer loans.228 
The SEC’s effort to regulate the industry created barriers to entry for 
economically marginal and geographically isolated borrowers. Around the 
time of increased scrutiny by the SEC, Prosper increased its minimum re-
quired credit score to 640.229 Lending Club began increasing its minimum 
credit score requirements in 2007 as a way to help build lender confi-
dence, and to respond to increased scrutiny by the SEC.230 Prosper’s and 
Lending Club’s required credit scores of 640 and 660, respectively, are 
substantially higher than domestic microfinance institutions require.231 If 
economically marginal and geographically isolated borrowers can meet 
these credit requirements, then they may be able to obtain some loans on 
these platforms, yet those amounts will not help such borrowers fully 
overcome their economic marginalization. Commentators have also noted 
that Prosper appears to be “evolving from a comprehensive market toward 
a market that primarily serves borrowers who have traditional access to 
credit.”232 Additionally, because the SEC has been the most aggressive 
regulator of for-profit P2P lending, thus far, borrowers’ risks are relegated 
to the protection of existing consumer protection laws. 
b. The GAO’s Recommendations for Regulating P2P Lending Are 
Inadequate to Enhance Marginalized Actors’ Access 
The Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) report233 on the status 
of the P2P lending industry included a performance audit of the industry 
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from August 2010 to July 2011.234 The report identifies two primary regu-
latory options for P2P lending that distinctly emphasize lender protection.235 
First, it suggests that the United States could continue “with the current bifur-
cated federal system—that is, protecting lenders through securities regulation 
and borrowers primarily through financial services regulators, which will in-
clude the new [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] CFPB—or ... consol-
idating borrower and lender protection under a single federal regulator, such 
as CFPB.”236 Neither of these regulatory options addresses the operational 
risk that the contracts, policies, and practices of the P2P lending intermedi-
aries may limit low-income and traditionally marginalized borrowers’ par-
ticipation in this market. The GAO’s suggestion that borrowers should be 
relegated to the existing consumer protection framework, or to the newly 
established CFPB, is therefore inadequate. This Article asserts that in-
creased SEC regulation primarily protects investors and lenders and restricts 
economically marginalized borrowers’ access to these markets. This Article 
also contends that the GAO’s proposed regulation of P2P markets is not de-
signed to expand economically marginalized borrowers’ access; and thereby 
fails to substantially advance distributive justice in these markets. 
Both the U.S. securities law regime and the U.S. consumer protection 
law regime privilege disclosure as the primary mechanism to protect in-
vestors’ and consumers’ interests in economic markets. Disclosure alone, 
however, will not address the institutional, economic, communal, and ge-
ographic reasons why historically marginalized and geographically isolat-
ed individuals may have difficulty accessing and benefiting from P2P 
markets. Since economically marginal and geographically isolated individu-
als have not had access to traditional American markets, they may not exhibit 
the same rational economic actor decision-making behavior upon which dis-
closure laws are based. Further, while the federal anti-discrimination laws that 
apply to P2P lending may address individualized instances of blatant discrim-
ination in P2P lending transactions, they do not address the historical legacy 
of group harms, nor how individuals’ geographic locations, as well as their 
economic, racial, and ethnic circumstances, may affect whether they can ac-
cess these markets. Thus, the Dodd Frank Act’s two suggested regulatory 
options are insufficient to address the access-to-credit risks that may plague 
users of for-profit P2P markets. 
In sum, while these P2P lending platforms offer borrowers and lenders 
the possibility of significant financial returns and greater access to credit, 
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the U.S.’s current, and proposed, approach to regulating P2P lending is not 
designed to help economically marginalized and geographically isolated 
market participants fully realize the benefits of these markets. For those 
historically marginalized individuals who can access these markets, it is an 
open question if the trust between individuals, that was abused by sub-
prime mortgage brokers and lenders and which is essential to face-to-face 
peer lending, and domestic microfinance, is present in online P2P, and can 
therefore, can help economically marginal and geographically isolated 
borrowers obtain new legitimate sources of financing. Perhaps U.S. regula-
tors should create incentives for these P2P platforms to develop policies that 
will enhance economically marginalized and geographically isolated actors’ 
access, while still maintaining policies that reduce fraud in these transactions. 
2. Non-Profit Peer-to-Peer Lending and Microfinance 2.0 
Kiva.org is a microfinance P2P lending platform operated by Kiva Mi-
crofunds (Kiva), a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization located in California.237 
Notably, Kiva reports that 81.54% of its borrowers are women, and most of 
those women borrowers are from developing countries.238 Kiva launched, in 
June of 2009, a fledgling U.S. market working with established U.S. micro-
finance institutions.239 Kiva currently works with seven U.S. microfinance 
institutions that fund only low-income microentrepreneurs within the United 
States.240 Many of these institutions are the same microfinance institutions 
described in Part I.B of this Article. Kiva calls its microfinance partner 
organizations field partners.241 “As of March 31, 2011, about 570,000 Kiva 
lenders had funded approximately $200 million for 273,000 microloans 
across 59 countries.”242 During the same time period, Kiva reported that 
each of its lenders funds an average of approximately eleven loans for 
about $380 per borrower.243 Lenders can fund part of a microloan for as 
little as $25, or they can fund an entire loan.244 Loans requested by Kiva 
borrowers can range from $1200 to as much as $10,000.245 Kiva uses the 
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third-party payment system, PayPal, to collect and transfer lender funds.246 
Notably, like the for-profit platforms, Kiva does not directly connect bor-
rowers and lenders, yet it performs a unique intermediating function in 
microfinance transactions. “Kiva facilitates the collection and transfer of 
capital for interest-free loans, funded by its lenders to approximately 130 
microfinance institutions around the world to fund-interest bearing loans to 
entrepreneurs in their communities.”247 
While Kiva provides prospective lenders with information about micro-
entrepreneurs in various countries, the loan funds contributed by lenders do 
not go directly to individual microborrowers.248 Instead, “Kiva aggregates 
funds from lenders and forwards them to microfinance organizations, which 
make and manage loans to the borrowers and transmit the repayments to 
Kiva, which in turn distributes the lenders’ shares of the funds received 
back to the lenders.”249 Thus, loan proceeds from one lender do not directly 
go to their chosen microborrower.250 In fact, the loans are often distributed 
to microentrepreneurs by Kiva’s participating microfinance institutions “be-
fore the loan details are even posted on Kiva’s website for lenders to 
view.”251 Instead, Kiva’s aggregate loan proceeds will replenish the micro-
finance institutions for loans that they made previously to borrowers who 
are similarly situated to the ones Kiva marketed to entice a particular lend-
er.252 
Because Kiva facilitates interest-free loans, Kiva lenders do not receive 
a return on their investment, although they receive repayments of princi-
pal.253 If a borrower fails to make a loan payment, the microfinance field 
partner notifies Kiva, and Kiva determines if the lender should receive a late 
or partial payment or no payment at all.254 If microborrowers on Kiva fail to 
repay their loans, lenders will lose their principal, but not any interest.255 
Thus, the SEC determined that Kiva’s loans are not securities because, 
although Kiva provides lenders a return of principal, it does not give lend-
ers the opportunity to earn interest.256 While lenders provide interest-free 
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loans and cannot achieve returns on their investments, the microfinance 
institutions that ultimately make the loans to microborrowers do charge 
the microborrowers interest on their loans to cover operating costs.257 The 
amount each microfinance field partner charges its borrowers differs, yet Ki-
va reported that as of “January 7, 2010, 35 percent is the Average Interest 
Rate and Fees Borrowers Pay (Porfolio Yield) to All Kiva Field Partners.”258 
However, Kiva’s international or foreign microfinance partners generally 
charge more to borrowers than Kiva’s U.S. domestic microfinance partners, 
who charge interests rates that typically range from twelve to nine percent.259 
While Kiva’s platform poses less financial risks for lenders than the 
for-profit P2P platforms, Kiva’s platform does present some unique finan-
cial and operational risks. One financial risk is that Kiva’s selected bor-
rowers will fail to repay their loans. Kiva does not guarantee its lenders’ 
loans, so it, therefore, it transfers the risk of nonpayment to the lender.260 
However, given Kiva’s reported repayment rates this risk is very small.261 
Another risk is that Kiva will fail, in its role as intermediator, to obtain 
repayments from its field partners. Once again, given Kiva’s reported re-
payment rates, this does not appear to be a problem. Kiva could also be-
come insolvent or also engage in some kind of fraud. Yet, since Kiva is a 
501(c)(3) organization, U.S. federal and state charities regulation should 
minimize the likelihood of these risks. Yet, there have been no reports 
about Kiva’s institutional capacity. 
The greatest operational risk to Kiva lenders is that Kiva will fail, as 
an intermediator, to identify field partners and borrowers consistent with 
the social objectives its lenders’ are seeking to further when making their 
contributions. Kiva retains the responsibility of identifying, screening, and 
rating all its microfinance field partners. Those field partners may fail in 
their role by identifying microborrowers who cannot repay, making loans 
to borrowers on problematic or usurious terms, using abusive techniques 
to get borrowers to repay, or engaging in other unfair and deceptive prac-
tices.262 Kiva’s end-user license agreements absolve the organization of 
liability for its field partners’ failures.263 While the United States’ consum-
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er protection, usury, and charities laws may deter Kiva’s U.S. microfinance 
field partners from harmful and fraudulent activities, the laws against such 
activities in other countries vary and can be more lax. Thus, this risk is not 
as great in the United States as in other countries. Yet in its U.S. efforts, 
Kiva relies on the existing domestic microfinance network, thereby mitigat-
ing the promise that online P2P lending holds for connecting borrowers to 
substantially new social and financing networks. Kiva eliminated its prior 
practice of allowing lenders to choose borrowers directly.264 Now Kiva 
chooses the microfinance partners, who choose the borrowers.265 This in-
termediation somewhat limits the opportunity for direct connection be-
tween the wealthy and poor that a P2P network could allow. As discussed 
later, the P2P platform allows lenders to form lending groups, but that al-
lows for further segmentation of lenders into existing interest groups, 
thereby diminishing P2P lending’s promise for geographically isolated 
groups to access new lenders outside of their immediate geographic or in-
terest groups. 
Another key risk to Kiva borrowers is that lenders will prefer foreign 
rather than American microborrowers because of a perception that mi-
croborrowers in developing countries are in greater need of funding or that 
smaller donations will go further in developing countries. While it is true 
that American microborrowers require slightly higher loan amounts be-
cause of the higher costs of business operation in the United States,266 the-
se facts belie the reality that historically disadvantaged and geographically 
isolated groups in the United States can still be economically marginalized 
from new markets due to their social, racial, ethnic, and class status. Kiva 
donors may be unaware of the history of geographic and economic mar-
ginalization outlined in previous Sections of this Article. As a result, Ki-
va’s contracts, policies, and practices may not encourage lenders to con-
sider U.S. markets, thereby undermining the utility of online P2P lending 
for traditionally marginalized groups in the United States. Kiva has only 
identified seven U.S.-based microfinance field partners out of a total of 
154 field partners.267 This fact suggests that while Kiva is a U.S.-based 
and incorporated microfinance P2P lending platform, it may not order its 
cyberspace in a way that maximizes the benefits of its market for histori-
cally marginalized groups in the United States. 
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B. Crowdfunding 2.0 
Crowdfunding is another emerging cyberfinancing market that repre-
sents a new opportunity for historically disadvantaged groups and individ-
uals to access capital. Scholars and industry experts generally define 
crowdfunding as an approach to raising capital for new enterprises by so-
liciting financial contributions online from a large number of contributors, 
at once, through an open call for funds.268 Crowdfunding is distinct from 
P2P lending in that crowdfunding enables one individual to connect with 
many individuals at one time online, rather than merely connecting one 
individual to another. However, many P2P lending intermediaries increas-
ingly consider themselves part of a larger crowdfunding industry, and they 
are adapting their lending practices to the crowdfunding model. The term 
crowdfunding, which describes an emerging and evolving industry, de-
rives from the term crowdsourcing.269 Author Jeff Howe apparently coined 
the term crowdsourcing in a 2006 Wired Magazine article describing the 
emerging phenomenon of information and ideas solicited and generated by 
groups through open calls on Web 2.0 social networking sites.270 An indi-
vidual or organization seeking a new idea, or a solution to a long-standing 
problem, can post their need for information on these sites and receive 
real-time, free responses from large numbers of individuals or organiza-
tions located anywhere. Contributors may receive a reward, or financial 
compensation, for their ideas, or they may voluntarily contribute solutions 
and ideas with no reward. Just as outsourcing helps companies reduce 
their fixed labor costs by finding cheaper labor abroad,271 crowdsourcing 
helps individuals and enterprises reduce the costs of obtaining ideas and 
information because they do not have to hire and pay employees, or inde-
pendent contractors, and they can reduce the costs of transmitting and ob-
taining information through these sites.272 
Crowdfunding also enables individuals and groups to bypass the costs 
and difficulties of obtaining money from investors, traditional banks, or even 
fringe financial institutions by using crowdfunding intermediary financial 
                                                 
268 See Burkett, supra note 7, at 66. 
269 Id. at 69 (defining crowdsourcing). 
270 Id. (quoting Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED 14.06, at 1 (June 2006), 
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html?pg=2&topic=crowds
&topic_set=). 
271 See id. Outsourcing, however, can also lead to a loss of job opportunities for domestic 
workers. Yet, because downsized domestic workers can use crowdsourcing sites they may 
experience benefits from crowdsourcing that are not present with outsourcing. 
272 Id. at 69–70. 
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portals. Crowdfunding became increasingly important as the health of the 
U.S. economy declined during and after the Great Recession. Most entre-
preneurs and individuals seeking capital for new startup enterprises or inno-
vative ideas were resigned to government small business loans, cash-
strapped domestic microfinancing programs, wealthy accredited investors, 
venture capital funds, or angel investors.273 Notably, with the exception of 
microfinance programs and government small business lending, these 
types of investors decline ninety-five percent of all business plans they 
receive.274 Lower income borrowers and entrepreneurs have even fewer 
options to obtain capital for their endeavors.275 Hence, crowdfunding rep-
resents a new opportunity for marginalized individuals and groups to ac-
cess capital outside of their traditional geographic, familial, or social net-
works. The organizations that develop crowdfunding portals act as crowd-
crowdfunding intermediaries. According to the Crowdfunding Industry 
Report’s estimates, by December 2013, there will be over 530 crowdfund-
ing platforms and intermediaries.276 This Article proceeds to provide a ty-
pology of different types of crowdfunding intermediaries and their portals. 
There are three primary types of crowdfunding intermediaries: (1) Patronage 
Crowdfunding Intermediaries,277 (2) Equity Crowdfunding Intermediaries,278 
and (3) Lending Crowdfunding Intermediaries.279 The last category includes 
the online P2P websites described in the previous Sections. The crowdfunding 
intermediaries and portals described below were chosen because they are ei-
ther, founded in the United States or they primarily serve a U.S. market. These 
portals are also among the most famous, longstanding, and well-established 
crowdfunding platforms. These intermediaries and portals are also members of, 
or are accredited by, the Crowdfunding Industry’s prime accreditation organi-
zation, the Crowdfunding Accreditation for Platform Standards (CAPS).280 
CAPS is “an initiative by Crowdsourcing.org to promote the adoption of best 
practices for the operation of crowdfunding platforms globally.”281 
                                                 
273 See Galloway, supra note 206, at 1–2. 
274 See Pozin, supra note 165. 
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1. Patronage Crowdfunding Intermediaries 
Patronage crowdfunding portals connect businesses, organizations, or 
individuals with financial contributors. These intermediaries, and their 
portals, are different in their emphasis, organizational structures, and prac-
tices, but generally contributors on these sites do not expect a financial 
return on their monetary contribution.282 The prototypical, and most fa-
mous, patronage crowdfunding portal is Kickstarter.com (Kickstarter). 
Launched in 2009, Kickstarter primarily connects artists, musicians, 
filmmakers, writers, and designers, residing in any location, with financial 
contributors for their creative projects.283 Individual or organizational 
“project creators” sign up with Kickstarter for free.284 Project creators de-
velop a creative project and then market it to potential contributors on 
Kickstarter’s project portal.285 A project campaign can be generated by an 
individual artist, a group or community of artists, a fledgling label, or an 
organization. Kickstarter’s choice of the word “project” to describe the 
undertaking seeking funding connotes that the endeavor is finite and is 
achievable within a relatively short timeframe. Project creators retain 
complete control over the framing, marketing, and design of their creative 
projects.286 Kickstarter, however, retains control over which creative projects 
will be released on the portal for potential funding.287 Kickstarter develops 
guidelines for possible projects and prohibits charity and cause funding, as 
well as projects to raise funds for personal expenses such as to pay bills, 
tuition, purchase items, or go on vacation.288 A recent New York Times 
article reported that in a given week, Kickstarter received 1890 proposals 
that were “each evaluated by a ‘community team’ of about a half-dozen 
people. About forty percent are rejected (although most of those flagrantly 
ignore the site’s guidelines—which bar charitable fund-raising, offering 
financial incentives and of course anything involving Jenny’s prom 
dress—or are incomprehensible).”289 
                                                 
282 See Burkett, supra note 7, at 64. 
283 Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter
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289 See Rob Walker, The Trivialities and Transcendence of Kickstarter, N.Y. TIMES, 
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When a creative project is approved by Kickstarter, project creators 
then make an open online call or request for funds on the crowdfunding 
portal to help bring the project to fruition. The amount of money sought 
for a project is determined by the project creator. Kickstarter’s model is 
“all-or-nothing funding,” meaning that the project must be fully funded 
and reach its fundraising goals within a specified timeframe in order for 
any money to change hands.290 The typical timeframe for full funding is 
thirty to sixty days.291 Potential contributors, referred to by Kickstarter as 
“backers,” also do not pay to join Kickstarter.292 Backers can peruse the 
different approved project campaigns available on Kickstarter and choose to 
donate to a particular campaign or campaigns.293 The “most common” con-
tribution on Kickstarter is $25.294 A few to thousands of contributors can fund 
a given campaign. Kickstarter uses the third-party collection service Amazon 
Payments to transmit funds.295 The contribution is “validated upon making 
the pledge, so Kickstarter’s collection rate is close to 100 percent.”296 
Project creators entice contributors with the creative strength of their 
idea, but also with tangible nonmonetary rewards related to the project, such 
as a copy of the creative project being funded, a limited edition, a free t-
shirt, a visit to see the band perform, a free screening, and other rewards.297 
These rewards are analogous to membership benefits that a member of a 
non-profit, membership organization might receive, yet they are related to 
the commercial projects being funded. Contributors only receive rewards if 
the entire project is funded within the specified timeframe. These rewards, 
however, do not provide contributors a financial return on their investment. 
Kickstarter takes a five percent commission on any successfully funded 
campaigns.298 As a for-profit company, this is how Kickstarter makes its 
money. Kickstarter’s initial success is uncontroverted.299 It raised $15 mil-
lion in its first year of existence.300 In 2011, Kickstarter raised $99 million 
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291 See Yancey Strickley, Shortening the Maximum Project Length, KICKSTARTER BLOG 
(June 17, 2011), http://www.kickstarter.com/blog/shortening-the-maximum-project-length. 
292 See Backer Questions, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/backer
%20questions (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
293 Id. 
294 See What Is Kickstarter?, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/start (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013). 
295 See Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, supra note 283. 
296 See id. 
297 See Discover Projects, KICKSTARTER, supra note 284. 
298 See Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, supra note 283. 
299 See Burkett, supra note 7, at 72–73. 
300 Id. at 73. 
2013] CYBERFINANCING FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 355 
for 27,000 projects.301 Kickstarter raises the most for film and music pro-
jects, with $32 million pledged for film projects in 2011, and $19.8 mil-
lion in 2011 for music projects.302 Projects generally surpass their goals, 
“typically hitting 130% of the target amount.”303 The average amount 
raised per project campaign is $4500.304 Ambitious and successful projects 
“routinely muster $100,000 or more,”305 and the most successful projects 
raise $1 million or more.306 Kickstarter represents an opportunity for geo-
graphically and economically marginalized individuals, groups, and com-
munities to access new sources of capital for artistic endeavors.307 Howev-
er, there is not a substantial community benefit to participating in 
Kickstarter, as cause funding is not permitted according to Kickstarter’s 
guidelines. Further, the average amount of money raised by each project 
on Kickstarter is not sufficient to sustain a start-up business endeavor that 
could alleviate poverty. Yet, the Kickstarter model does expand the fi-
nancing possibilities for traditionally marginalized economic actors seek-
ing funding for creative projects. 
Kickstarter’s success has led to a proliferation of other crowdfunding 
intermediary portals based upon the patronage model such as IndieGoGo.com 
(Indiegogo) and Rockethub.com (Rockethub). Indiegogo, founded in 2008, 
initially served as a source of funding for independent filmmakers,308 but it 
expanded in 2009 to include many other creative and noncreative indus-
tries, including those that Kickstarter does not fund, such as cause fund-
ing—environment, education, health, politics, religion community, and 
entrepreneurial funding—food, small business, sports, and technology.309 
Rockethub.com is a crowdfunding intermediary that serves groups similar 
to those served by Indiegogo, but also targets scientists.310 Indiegogo is 
also a worldwide crowdfunding platform; however, Indiegogo is incorpo-
rated in the United States and it only accepts and disburses funds in U.S. 
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/blog/2011-the-stats. 
302 Id. 
303 G.F., Crowdfunding: Micro no more, BABBAGE (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.economist
.com/blogs/babbage/2012/01/crowdfunding. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 See, e.g., Jacques-Jean Tiziou, How Philly Moves, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter
.com/projects/jjtiziou/how-philly-moves?ref=most-funded (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
308 See About Us, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/about/our-story (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013). 
309 Compare id., with Project Guidelines, KICKSTARTER, supra note 288. 
310 See Learn More, ROCKETHUB, http://www.rockethub.com/learnmore/intro#what-is
-rockethub-answer (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
356 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:309 
dollars.311 Receiving $15 million from a recent Series A venture capitalist 
financing round, Indiegogo has raised a larger amount of equity financing 
than Kickstarter to support its operations.312 Indiegogo allows users to cre-
ate and contribute to campaigns for free, but it has a slightly different 
funding scheme than Kickstarter that enables campaign creators to retain 
the funds they raise, even if they do not meet their goal within a scheduled 
time frame.313 
Under its flexible funding model, if a campaign does not reach its fund-
ing goals, then campaign creators keep all money raised minus a nine per-
cent fee, and creators must fulfill all pledge promises.314 Indiegogo’s fund-
ing model enables campaign creators to benefit from any amount of money 
raised, yet reduces the incentives to meet and set realistic goals. Additional-
ly, some intermediaries more narrowly connect funding seekers and con-
tributors in particular sectors,315 interest groups,316 or ethnic communities.317 
As such, they limit the bridging potential of cyberfinancing because indi-
viduals seeking funding on these sites can only access more limited social 
networks than what is possible on portals that support all types of crowd-
funding in any location. Thus, the more targeted crowdfunding portals do not 
have the redistributive potential of their more inclusive counterparts. 
Many newer crowdfunding intermediaries include advancing economic 
and social justice as a primary goal.318 StartSomeGood.com (StartSomeGood), 
for example, connects non-profits and social entrepreneurs319 with seed capital. 
                                                 
311 Indiegogo FAQ, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/indiegogo-faq (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013); see also Jay A. Ferdandez, With a $15 Million Infusion, Crowdfunder 
Indiegogo Angles for World Domination, INDIEWIRE (2012), http://www.indiewire.com/arti
cle/crowdfunding-powerhouse-indiegogo-angles-for-world-domination-with-infusion-of-15
-million (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (explaining that Indiegogo has a presence in more than 
190 countries). 
312 See Ferdandez, supra note 311; Colleen Taylor, Indiegogo Raises $15 Million 
Series A to Make Crowdfunding Go Mainstream, TECHCRUNCH (June 6, 2012), http://tech
crunch.com/2012/06/06/indiegogo-funding-15-million-crowdfunding/. 
313 See INDIEGOGO, supra note 311; Burkett, supra note 7 at 73. 
314 See INDIEGOGO, supra note 311. 
315 See, e.g., Joe Petrucci, FundingWorks Combines Gamification, Crowdfunding for 
Local Nonprofits, FLYING KITE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.flyingkitemedia.com/innova
tionnews/fundingworks0320.aspx. 
316 See, e.g., FAITHFUNDER, https://www.faithfunder.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013); 
INLU, https://www.inlu.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
317 See, e.g., JEWCER, http://jewcer.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (a crowdfunding plat-
form for projects, ideas, and causes benefitting the global Jewish community and Israel). 
318 Frank Barry, 9 Social Media for Social Good Sites You Should Know About, 
NETWITSTHINKTANK (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.netwitsthinktank.com/online-fundrais
ing/9-social-media-for-social-good-sites-you-should-know-about.htm. 
319 About StartSomeGood, STARTSOMEGOOD, http://startsomegood.com/Help/About 
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“StartSomeGood allows all forms of social good initiatives, nonprofit and for-
profit, one-off and ongoing, local and international ....”320 As with other inter-
mediaries, StartSomeGood determines which campaigns qualify as social 
ventures and which will be released to the public on the portal.321 Campaigns 
on StartSomeGood establish a total fundraising goal and a “tipping point” 
goal, which is the minimum amount of money the campaign creator deter-
mines is needed to “start doing good.”322 Without this amount, the social ven-
ture cannot happen at all. Fundraising for the “tipping point” is conducted 
under the “all or nothing model,” such that if the tipping point is not reached, 
no money changes hands.323 Once the tipping point is reached, campaign cre-
ators can keep whatever amount is raised above the tipping point.324 Start-
SomeGood charges a five percent fee of total funds received by a campaign 
after the tipping point is reached, and after a third-party payment processing 
fee of three percent is levied.325 Notably, StartSomeGood is a for-profit or-
ganization.326 Most donations from campaign supporters are not tax-
deductible, barring some exceptions (for example, donations to non-
profits).327 Although StartSomeGood has advancing social and economic jus-
tice as its mission because it targets socially motivated audiences, it may limit 
economically and geographically isolated social entrepreneurs’ financial net-
working options. Contributors who are not interested in social good may not 
learn about these projects if they use only for-profit-oriented portals. Thus, 
StartSomeGood’s targeting can limit the potential audiences that social ven-
ture promoters can access to support their causes and endeavors. 
2. Equity Crowdfunding Intermediaries 
Patronage crowdfunding was the predominant model of crowdfunding328 
prior to President Barack Obama’s signing of Congress’s bipartisan Jumpstart 
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Our Business Startups Act on April 5, 2012.329 As described below, this new 
legislation makes it legal for crowdfunding portals to allow entrepreneurs 
to provide their online contributors with an equity, profit or revenue shar-
ing interest in their endeavors. Since the JOBS Act’s recent enactment, 
equity crowdfunding portals are developing rapidly. It is unclear how the-
se newcomers will affect the popularity of the patronage model, and 
whether their presence will be a positive or negative development for mar-
ginalized economic actors. Prior to the enactment of the JOBS Act, most 
venture or campaign promoters seeking crowdfunding were unwilling to 
grant equity interests to contributors because granting such interests re-
quired promoters to comply with complex, and costly, federal and state 
securities laws.330 As explained earlier, U.S. securities laws do not define 
the term “security.”331 According to the tests established by the Supreme 
Court in Howey, transactions facilitated through an equity crowdfunding 
portal would likely qualify as “investment contracts” because investors 
contribute through the portal with the expectation that they will make a 
profit solely from the efforts of the campaign promoters or the crowdfund-
ing intermediaries themselves.332 
Before the JOBS Act, crowdfunding intermediaries that allowed ven-
ture promoters to offer investors a financial return would have had to 
comply with the SEC’s registration requirements.333 These transactions 
could also qualify as private placement offerings, which are exempt from 
the full registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933; however, 
private placement offerings are primarily available to wealthy and sophis-
ticated “accredited investors,” who have some prior relationship to the 
venture or campaign promoter, or to the promoter’s affiliate.334 The pri-
vate placement laws also allow a company to have only up to 500 non-
accredited investors before it must register its offerings with the SEC and 
qualify as a public company.335 Companies seeking funding through equity 
crowdfunding portals could easily violate this restriction, forcing a company 
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to go public upon receiving a certain number of non-accredited investors via 
the portal. Lastly, crowdfunding’s redistributive promise lies in its ability 
to connect fledgling enterprises to new economic and social networks. 
Forcing companies to comply with the private placement requirements 
would have undermined the industry’s redistributive potential. 
The JOBS Act, however, creates a new crowdfunding exemption that 
permits newly defined “emerging growth companies” (EGCs) to raise up to 
$1 million of capital from a large pool of investors through crowdfunding 
portals.336 The Act defines an EGC as an issuer that had total annual gross 
revenues of less than $1 billion during its most recently completed fiscal 
year.337 The Act enables EGCs to provide contributors with equity interests 
in their ventures by selling securities that are exempt from traditional regis-
tration and exemption requirements.338 The Act also legalizes “general so-
licitation,”339 enabling EGCs to use crowdfunding portals and other social 
networking sites, such as Facebook and LinkedIn, to raise investment capi-
tal for their enterprises. Crowdfunding transactions can only be conducted 
through a broker or crowdfunding portal that is registered with the SEC.340 
The Act provides that crowdfunding intermediary portals cannot provide in-
vestment advice or recommendations to investors, as can brokers.341 Further, 
the crowdfunding portals must ensure that investors review certain educational 
material and acknowledge that investors both understand the risks of the in-
vestment and can internalize or handle those risks.342 The crowdfunding portals 
must also take steps to reduce fraud in these transactions.343 
The JOBS Act also permits EGCs to stay private for a longer period of 
time and makes it easier for them to go public on the securities markets 
when ready. Prior regulations made it difficult for small companies to ob-
tain equity investments from a large numbers of small non-accredited inves-
tors without registering with the SEC.344 The existing securities registration 
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exemptions do not directly fit the crowdfunding model.345 Regulatory hur-
dles also increased the costs associated with becoming a public company.346 
The JOBS Act resolves these problems by raising the number of non-
accredited investors an EGC can have to 2000, and excluding employee 
shareholders in that number.347 This permits EGCs to obtain more investors 
through crowdfunding portals without having to comply with the costly tra-
ditional securities regime. The Act also extends the number of years EGCs 
have to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley348 to five years and reduces the num-
ber of required audited financial statements.349 To reduce fraud and protect 
unsophisticated investors, the Act also limits the amount each individual 
investor can invest as well as the aggregate value of securities that a particu-
lar EGC issuer can offer through a crowdfunding intermediary. 
During any twelve-month period, an EGC issuer may sell up to $1 mil-
lion of its securities.350 Investors with income or net worth of less than 
$100,000 are only permitted to invest the greater of $2000 or of five percent 
of their annual or net worth or income in any twelve-month period.351 In-
vestors with an income or net worth greater than $100,000 can invest the 
greater of $100,000 or ten percent of their annual income or net worth in 
any twelve-month period.352 Investors are also limited to investing up to 
$100,000 in crowdfunding issues in a given twelve-month period.353 Fur-
ther, investors who purchase securities in a crowdfunding transaction are 
restricted from transferring or selling those securities for a period of one 
year.354 Finally, consistent with the SEC’s focus on disclosure as a method 
of investor protection, EGC issuers of securities must also comply with a 
number of disclosure requirements. The Act requires EGC issuers to pro-
vide investors through the crowdfunding portal with the following: (1) a 
description of the issuer, its members, including the name, legal status, 
physical address, and names of directors and officers holding more than 
twenty percent of the shares of the issuer; (2) the anticipated business plan 
of the issuer, the target offering amount and the deadline to reach the target 
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offering amount, and the price of the securities to the public; (3) the own-
ership and capital structure of the issuer, including the terms of the securi-
ties being offered.355 
Many equity crowdfunding intermediaries now have increased confi-
dence to enter the market as a result of the JOBS Act reforms and the im-
pending SEC implementing regulations.356 Several new crowdfunding in-
termediaries are entering the market and will begin operating after the SEC 
introduces its regulations.357 While crowdfunding options are expanding in 
the wake of the JOBS Act, there is still a great deal of uncertainty sur-
rounding the forthcoming SEC regulations. There is some concern that the 
SEC could overregulate and essentially undo any benefit of the crowdfund-
ing provisions.358 In response, the Crowdfunding Intermediary Regulatory 
Advocates (CFIRA) are advocating for rules and regulations that are con-
sistent with the purpose of the JOBS Act—“improving access to the public 
capital markets for emerging growth companies” that will be job creators.359 
The group includes several crowdfunding intermediary executives and inno-
vators, including the co-founder of Crowdfunder.com.360 Until the SEC issues 
its regulations, many crowdfunding intermediaries are delaying their plans to 
develop portals that permit equity interests. RockthePost.com, for example, is a 
crowdfunding portal that is currently only using the patronage model.361 Rock 
the Post is still interested in allowing investors to contribute funds in exchange 
for equity, but it will wait until the SEC regulations are published.362 Kickstart-
er also does not plan to ever allow contributors to receive equity, profit, or 
revenue sharing interests in exchange for their contributions.363 Kickstarter’s 
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founder stated, “[w]e’re not gearing up for the equity wave if it comes 
....”364 
3. Lending and Debt-Based Crowdfunding Intermediaries 
Lastly, lending or debt-based crowdfunding intermediaries are portals 
that allow lenders to receive a return on their investment in the form of 
“fixed periodic income [payments] and ... repayment of the original princi-
pal investment.”365 Lending or debt-based crowdfunding includes P2P lend-
ing, peer-to-business lending, and social lending.366 This form of crowd-
funding enables borrowers—both individuals and businesses—to appeal to 
the crowd rather than a traditional financial institution for loans or debt-
based securities. SoMoLend.com (SoMoLend), for example, is an accredit-
ed crowdfunding platform that “connect[s small businesses] with banks, 
corporations, Chambers of Commerce, and cities to get small business loans 
... at lower than average rates.”367 It endeavors “to serve small businesses 
that are not being served by traditional funding,”368 and to provide investors 
“higher-than-market return[s].”369 Like other P2P lending platforms,370 
SoMoLend gives its lenders payment-dependent notes and works with a 
partner bank to execute transactions.371 Entrepreneurs sign up for SoMo-
Lend by completing a loan application and creating a web-based SoMo-
Lend profile.372 Borrowers provide credit information to SoMoLend, plus 
other information about their personal and business finances, and SoMo-
Lend generates a star-based risk level rating based upon that infor-
mation.373 Star ratings range from one to five stars.374 A one-star borrower 
must at least have a personal credit score above 550 and a five-star bor-
rower must have a personal credit score above 800.375 The commercial 
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loans available to business borrowers range from $100 to $1 million.376 
According to SoMoLend, the site still facilitates loans to individuals with 
little to no credit history377 and providing individual and commercial loans 
to underserved entrepreneurs is one of the company’s stated goals.378 Yet, 
it is unclear how the company will square this goal with its for-profit mis-
sion. SoMoLend’s approach to lending also has a geographic dimension. 
SoMoLend’s “technology platform uses a GPS location tracking system 
(think foursquare) so investors can view a map of approved business bor-
rowers in their [geographic] community.”379 Interestingly, this feature en-
courages lenders to lend to entrepreneurs in their immediate geographic com-
munity.380 This feature may limit the networking potential of crowdfunding by 
facilitating connections only between lenders and entrepreneurs in the same 
geographic area. 
C. New Identities, Reputations, and Communities 2.0 
Cyberfinancing sites create new cyberspaces for repeated economic ac-
tivity. Borrowers and lenders, or investors and entrepreneurs, can now en-
gage in repeat transactions on the same site and craft new identities in this 
cyberspace. Borrowers and entrepreneurs previously marginalized from 
mainstream American markets can now develop new identities and reputa-
tions online based upon the strength of their ideas, the popularity of their 
campaigns, and their repayment and credit histories. Lenders and investors, 
as well as borrowers and entrepreneurs, can form groups online and evalu-
ate one another’s economic performance. As such, cyberfinancing markets 
enable individuals and groups to create new communities online. Scholars 
and practitioners who view these economic exchanges merely as discrete 
one-time transactions may ignore the complexity and community building 
potential of these spaces and their redistributive consequences. 
Prosper, for example, facilitates the creation of groups of prospective 
borrowers and lenders on its platform. Individuals or organizations can 
register on the site as “group leaders” and, upon signing a registration 
statement, can head a group of prospective borrowers or lenders.381 Indi-
viduals form groups and communities of interest, as well as communities 
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based upon identities or geographic location. Group leaders or borrower 
groups do not guarantee other members’ payments.382 However, group 
leaders are responsible for establishing the group, recruiting members, act-
ing as a liaison between Prosper and group members, and monitoring, pro-
tecting, and promoting the integrity of their group.383 One of the purposes 
of borrower groups is to use group social norms to encourage borrowers to 
repay on time.384 Prior to September 2007, group leaders received a find-
er’s fee for each loan resulting from its group listing, but Prosper canceled 
that feature.385 These groups develop an identity and reputation within 
Prosper’s cyberspace. Prosper enables users to search groups386 and rates 
the various groups based upon their performance.387 
LendingClub does not use group leaders, but individual borrowers and 
lenders do develop a reputation on the site based upon their repayment his-
tories or funding activity.388 Kickstarter promotes campaigns and creates 
communities of interest by categorizing campaigns and highlighting fea-
tured campaigns.389 Among the featured campaigns are staff picks, recent-
ly launched, most funded, curated pages, popular pages, and ending soon 
campaigns.390 It also segments campaigns by cities.391 Indiegogo, similar-
ly, segments campaigns by cities392 and facilitates the creation of new 
identities, reputations, and communities online through its Gogofactor Ex-
posure.393 Gogofactor is a “merit-based algorithm that tracks the level of 
activity of each campaign based on how much you share, update, and at-
tract funding.”394 Based upon a campaign creator’s “gogofactor activity,” 
Indiegogo offers to expose the campaign through social media outreach in 
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their community, through the content creation process, and by giving the cam-
paign press access.395 Both crowdfunding platforms also highlight campaigns 
through blogs and through partner crowdfunding sites or organizations.396 
Like Kickstarter and Indiegogo, StartSomeGood also promotes cam-
paigns through a blog and links to other social networking communities.397 
StartSomeGood has similar features to help funders segment their contri-
butions to different types of social entrepreneurs.398 It also allows users to 
filter campaigns by country, cause, or partner.399 Kiva also facilitates the 
creation of “lending teams.”400 Lending teams are groups of lenders with 
common interests, demography, or geography.401 Members of Kiva’s lend-
ing teams continue lending as individuals, but they have the option to 
count their individual loans towards the loan totals for their lending 
team.402 Any lender can create a lending team.403 Currently, there are 626 
domestic lending teams out of the 23,467 lending teams on Kiva.404 How-
ever, Kiva does not facilitate the creation of borrower groups. Because 
Kiva works with microfinance field partners, they likely do not feel the 
need to facilitate borrower groups, but it is interesting that the micro-
finance field partners and their respective borrowers are denied a network-
ing opportunity provided to lenders. These groups facilitate limited social 
networking among members, but more importantly, they enable users to 
segment their cyberfinancing experience. Just as public officials create 
jurisdictional boundaries, zoning, and land use laws to segment and create 
markets in geographic space, cyberfinancing intermediaries’ access and 
interactional rules order cyberfinancing markets and enable users to seg-
ment cyberspace. Yet, the public has little control over these practices, ex-
cept to give the intermediaries feedback about their sites. 
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III. REGULATING CYBERFINANCING FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 
A. Social Networking, Internet Intermediaries and Trust 
1. Expanding Social and Financial Networks—The Strength of Weak Ties 
If properly operated and regulated, cyberfinancing networks can en-
hance an individual’s or a community’s weak social ties.405 Weak social 
ties describe connections between individuals or communities who do not 
interact frequently and who know each other only vaguely.406 Strong social 
ties describe bonds between members of closely knit, friendship, or familial 
networks.407 As sociologist Mark Granovetter explained in his seminal arti-
cle, The Strength of Weak Ties, “weak [social] ties are an important resource 
in making possible mobility opportunity.”408 Individuals and groups are bet-
ter able to connect to new financing, job, or economic networks though 
weak ties than through strong ones. 
However, the policies, practices, and contracts of the cyberfinancing 
intermediaries will determine, in part, how much an individual or group 
can develop weak ties that bridge to new opportunities. Cyberfinancing 
intermediaries that develop minimum credit scores or minimum capitaliza-
tion requirements will inevitably limit access. Cyberfinancing intermediar-
ies that encourage users to seek crowdfunding or loans through their exist-
ing familial or friendship networks will also limit the bridging capacity of 
these networks. If Kiva does not adequately develop its American capaci-
ty, then American microentrepreneurs may not be able to connect to new 
microfinancing networks. Thus, while these cyberfinancing networks un-
doubtedly provide marginalized groups in the United States opportunities 
to develop more weak social ties, the market practices of these intermedi-
aries may limit the bridging opportunities that cyberfinancing can provide. 
Marginalized borrowers and entrepreneurs must now trust the cy-
berfinancing intermediaries to structure their operations to maximize ac-
cess.409 Yet, lenders and investors will also trust that the intermediaries 
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will limit their financial and operational risks. These interests will often 
conflict, and in the absence of regulation, it is likely that lenders’ and in-
vestors’ interests will prevail, since the majority of cyberfinancing inter-
mediaries are for-profit organizations designed to maximize profits. While 
users will rely on their own positive experiences with these cyberfinancing 
intermediaries to evaluate the intermediaries’ trustworthiness, they will 
also rely on the reputations of the Internet intermediaries, and the interme-
diaries’ corporate or organizational forms. 
2. Trusting the Intermediaries and Hybrid Organizational Forms 
Investors seeking a monetary return from their participation in cyber-
financing markets must trust that the for-profit cyberfinancing intermedi-
aries will identify good investment opportunities and minimize fraud and 
abuse on these sites, because the cyberfinancing intermediaries are profit- 
maximizing entities. In unregulated complex markets, the neoclassical and 
new institutional economic presumption is that with full disclosure and 
perfect information, market competition between profit-oriented cyberfi-
nancing intermediaries will provide sufficient discipline against poor qual-
ity, opportunism, or malfeasance.410 Yet, the recent subprime mortgage 
crisis illustrates that in complex and unregulated markets, pursuit of profit 
alone does not provide sufficient deterrents to opportunism, fraud, and 
abuse. Further, first-time investors, borrowers, and entrepreneurs often 
will not have perfect information in these markets, and thus cannot be as-
sured that the institutional or organizational forms of the for-profit cyber-
financing intermediaries will deter opportunism and fraud. 
Moreover, contributors on these sites, who are not seeking a financial 
return on their investment, have even less assurance that the organizational 
forms of the cyberfinancing intermediaries will provide adequate protec-
tion against opportunism or will adequately advance social returns. Henry 
Hansmann, in his definitive article on the non-profit organizational form, 
The Role of Non-Profit Enterprise, explained that a traditional justification 
for the existence of non-profit organizations is contract failure.411 In the 
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past, individuals seeking to advance social goals by providing financing 
and/or goods and services to low-income individuals could often not con-
tract directly with the individuals they were seeking to serve.412 Contribu-
tors had no direct connection with the beneficiaries, so non-profit—rather 
than for-profit—producers or intermediaries were a more sensible choice 
because non-profit organizations must advance social goals and are pre-
vented from using any excess profit to provide financial returns to insiders 
or investors.413 Because non-profit intermediaries’ non-distribution con-
straints eliminate competing financial objectives, they are more likely to 
fulfill social objectives.414 Contributors can also reduce their monitoring 
costs because the state monitors the behavior of the intermediaries.415 
While these justifications for the non-profit form still hold true in many 
instances, the operation of cyberfinancing markets complicates these assump-
tions. Cyberfinancing intermediaries allow contributors and beneficiaries to 
interact and to contract more directly than before the development of Web 
2.0. Further, many cyberfinancing intermediaries purporting to provide social 
returns are for-profit organizations. StartSomeGood is a for-profit organiza-
tion designed to help social entrepreneurs.416 It seeks certification as a B 
corporation to indicate to investors that advancing social objectives is a cen-
tral part of its mission, but it still must cater to the needs of its investors.417 
SoMoLend is a for-profit lender who provides investors a return on their 
investment, but also seeks to expand access to credit for traditionally mar-
ginalized entrepreneurs.418 
Kiva is a non-profit organization whose intermediation in microfinance 
transactions reflects the existing structure of microfinance; however, it also 
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fulfills a financial function.419 Kiva also provides contributors a return of 
principal, while endeavoring to advance the social cause of economic em-
powerment.420 Notably, Kiva’s founders originally intended Kiva to be a 
for-profit LLC.421 Yet, “given the legal issues around securitization and 
charging interest, they ‘decided that the 501(c)(3) status would help 
[them] form a bond with [their] users and raise a small amount of donation 
capital to get the idea off the ground.’”422 Presumably, Kiva’s choice of 
the non-profit form provides a “signaling” function to Kiva’s lenders, field 
partners, and microborrowers that Kiva is a “trustworthy” intermediary 
who will fulfill its social mission.423 Yet, it may be equally beneficial for 
Kiva to eventually adopt an LC3 organizational form, or to adopt a corpo-
rate form that would enable it to qualify as an equity crowdfunding inter-
mediary under the new crowdfunding exemption. 
As cyberfinancing markets increasingly blur the lines between for-
profit and non-profit organizations, cyberfinancing intermediaries’ organi-
zational forms alone do not provide sufficient market discipline to enhance 
trust and to minimize opportunism in these markets. Disclosures provided 
to state and federal regulators also may be insufficient to capture how be-
nign rules and organizational structures operate to prevent poorer, or tradi-
tionally marginalized economic actors, from participation in these mar-
kets. As Mark Granovetter eloquently explained, “both order and disorder, 
honesty and malfeasance [in economic markets] have more to do with 
structures of such relations than they do with organizational form.”424 
In complex economic transactions, the economic interactions and social 
relations that occur between and within hierarchically integrated organiza-
tions can produce or inhibit trust or malfeasance. Thus, as cyberfinancing 
markets involve an increasingly complex proliferation of organizational and 
institutional forms that provide similar and/or related functions and that 
work collaboratively,425 the interactions and relations between cyberfinancing 
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intermediaries may become as relevant as the interactions within a cyberfi-
nancing intermediary or between a cyberfinancing intermediary and its cus-
tomers. In that event, organizational structures are inadequate to ensure ac-
countability to traditionally marginalized economic actors. While the recent 
SEC-focused regulation of cyberfinancing industries should provide inves-
tors some protection from fraud and abuse in these markets, inexperienced 
borrowers and entrepreneurs cannot rely on the current regulatory structure 
of cyberfinancing markets to protect their interests. 
3. Laws, Practices, and Norms in Cyberspace 
It is evident that cyberspace enables “ways of interacting that were not 
possible before” its development.426 Yet, there are similarities between the 
social construction of geographic space and the social construction of cyber-
space. Laws, norms, and community practices in cyberspace give human in-
teraction in that space meaning. Laws both influence and reflect the social 
allocations of power within geographic and cyberspace. Just as jurisdictional 
boundaries and zoning and land use laws define space, constitute markets 
within space, and include and exclude certain individuals from markets, the 
visible and invisible codes of cyberfinancing websites order social relations 
within those spaces and reflect certain political and value choices.427 The vis-
ible codes of cyberfinancing markets that determine who can and who cannot 
participate in cybermarkets are the end user license agreements, privacy poli-
cies, group leader agreements, organizational structures, selection and partici-
pation requirements, segmenting practices, and interactional rules. The invisi-
ble codes of cyberspace are those program decisions that order cyberspace 
that cannot be seen by consumers.428 These codes also determine the quality 
of users’ experiences in that space. 
The cyberfinancing markets discussed in this Article tend to promote 
transparency, regarding their visible codes, by publishing financial and 
non-financial information about users, by providing their contracts and 
policies on the web, and by seeking customer feedback. Yet, the institu-
tional concerns of these cyberfinancing intermediaries will inevitably in-
fluence how they order their cybermarkets. Cyberfinancing intermediaries 
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are private organizations that are making value choices about how cyberfi-
nancing markets should be structured. The consumer public has limited 
control over cyberfinancing intermediaries’ choices. Initially, the techno-
logical advances and practices of these cyberfinancing intermediaries pro-
vided benefits to, and advanced efficiency for, all users by reducing the 
transaction costs associated with connection, selection, lending, and fi-
nancing. In fact, because these intermediaries did not have physical bank 
branches, were unregulated, and could facilitate transactions across time 
and space in an efficient way, they had a competitive advantage over other 
financial institutions.429 
However, motivated by profits, and in response to increased SEC 
scrutiny and regulation, the for-profit P2P lending intermediaries tended 
to direct more benefits to lenders and to restrict marginal borrowers’ ac-
cess to these markets.430 Prosper and LendingClub further intermediated 
in transactions and increased their minimum credit score requirements. 
Prosper stopped giving bonuses to group leaders to discourage fraud.431 
The non-profit platform Kiva chose to work within the existing framework of 
microfinance institutions—rather than to connect microborrowers and lenders 
directly—to minimize lenders’ and Kiva’s financial risks. Additionally, the 
United States’ current and proposed regulation of crowdfunding markets ap-
pears to privilege investors’ interests and impose costs on entrepreneurs. Alt-
hough the JOBS Act does partially increase inexperienced actors’ access to 
capital markets by removing some regulatory and transaction cost barriers, it 
still creates significant disclosure and regulatory burdens for issuers of equity 
interests on crowdfunding portals.432 
In order to protect investors, the JOBS Act provides that “[i]ssuers must 
furnish full financial statements for even the smallest offerings. Those fi-
nancial statements must be reviewed by independent public accountants if 
the offering is for $100,000 or more, and audited if the offering is for more 
than $500,000.”433 It will be difficult for many start-up companies and 
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first-time issuers, who have no prior experience with capital markets, to un-
derstand and comply with these disclosure requirements.434 The Act does 
not include a “substantial compliance” provision as do other securities ex-
emptions, leaving inexperienced entrepreneurs potentially liable for “inno-
cent and immaterial” violations.435 The Act also does not contain protec-
tions for issuers who “reasonably believed” that they complied with the 
requirements of the disclosure rules.436 Lastly, the Act’s limits on how 
much each investor can invest are high and do not distinguish between the 
disclosure requirements for small investments of, say, less than $500 and 
investments ranging from $500 to $2000.437 Consequently, the Sustainable 
Economies Law Center—through the umbrella organization, the American 
Sustainable Business Council (ASBC)—proposed that the SEC create a 
“two-tier regulatory system ... with a reduced regulatory burden for small, 
local offerings.”438 They propose that smaller investments of up to $250 per 
investor from investors who live in the same state or within a 200-mile radi-
us should be subject to reduced disclosures since the risk of loss and fraud is 
less for smaller investments from issuers in close proximity to investors.439 
This regulatory suggestion provides a solution to the increased disclosure 
burdens that the JOBS Act imposes on small, inexperienced issuers. 
Further, the increased presence of equity crowdfunding intermediaries 
may affect the popularity of the patronage model, which currently pro-
vides opportunities for economically marginalized individuals and groups 
to obtain funding. As venture capital funds and wealthier accredited inves-
tors have more confidence to enter the crowdfunding market, they may 
dominate the direction of the market and encourage intermediaries to de-
velop rules, practices, and norms that disadvantage smaller, first-time is-
suers, investors, and entrepreneurs. Historically disadvantaged groups also 
often have difficulty obtaining capital from mainstream American capital 
markets.440 This is not typically the result of intentional racial animus, but 
rather because start-up minority and urban entrepreneurs frequently do not 
have access to the social and financial networks that lead to angel investment 
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or venture capital.441 Thus, these new players on the crowdfunding scene 
may divert attention and interest away from inexperienced EGCs towards 
the kinds of start-up and Internet companies that angel investors and ven-
ture capital funds traditionally invest in—those with the quickest potential 
for the highest returns. Additionally, venture capital investors, and increas-
ingly angel investors, often require significant control over the entities in 
which they invest. EGCs owned by individuals traditionally marginalized 
from mainstream American markets should be wary that their participation 
in these markets may leave them susceptible to investors who will require 
substantial control of their companies in exchange for relatively small in-
vestments. Thus, these cyberfinancing intermediaries’ policies and prac-
tices, and the United States’ efforts to regulate these markets, reflect 
tradeoffs between the interests of mainstream and wealthy market actors 
and the interests of poorer and more marginalized economic actors. With-
out a regulatory adjustment, these trends will persist, thereby undermining 
economic justice. 
4. Weblining in Cyberfinancing Markets442 
The invisible codes of cyberspace are “how the software and hardware 
(i.e., the ‘code’ of cyberspace) that make cyberspace what it is also regulate 
cyberspace as it is.”443 Thus, software programs that determine who can en-
ter cyberspace, what they can extract from it, who owns what is produced 
there, and whether that product can be shared, operate to regulate cyber-
space and shape cybermarkets.444 Like land use laws and jurisdictional 
boundaries in geographic space, the invisible codes of cyberspace also re-
flect certain value choices that are the result of existing social allocations of 
power. Yet, unlike land use laws and jurisdictional boundaries in geographic 
                                                 
441 See, e.g., id. at 79 (“The problems that urban entrepreneurs encounter include, for 
example, access to financial, social, and human capital, regulatory hurdles, and high 
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443 See LESSIG, supra note 426, at 5. 
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space, the invisible codes of cyberspace are not made public and are not 
subject to public comment or review. Invisible codes are now shaping 
cybermarkets. Banks, retailers, social networking sites, and Internet brows-
ers now use invisible programming and tracking codes to influence who can 
participate in and benefit from certain cybermarkets. Some companies use 
this information to segment and customize markets to meet both consumers’ 
and companies’ needs. 
Yet, just as banks and other market actors used to “redline” consumers 
based on their demographic and geographic profiles, e-commerce compa-
nies are increasingly using “weblining” to target and segment e-customers 
based on their demographics and Internet use patterns. Companies with an 
online presence, such as banks, may develop account profiles of individual 
customers. These profiles “help the firm determine how much time, effort, 
or investment should be devoted to those customers.”445 These companies 
give customers who generate, or who are likely to generate, more money for 
the firm higher ratings. The ratings often determine whether the company 
will refuse to serve certain customers, charge higher fees or prices to certain 
customers, or give certain customers lower quality products and substandard 
customer service. These ratings consist of standard financial information 
such as credit scores, but often also include demographic and other infor-
mation obtained through data mining. Programs track “[i]ndividuals’ race, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, personal habits, web-browsing practices, life-
style choices, health status, political persuasion,” zip codes, and other in-
formation.446 As with redlining, the negative effect of weblining is to make 
some customers pay more for the same service or to deny some customers 
service based on proxies for value. Companies use this data to predict cus-
tomers’ behavior and then to segment markets based on that presumed be-
havior. As redlining made a geographic map of individuals’ residences and 
presumed certain economic behavior based on their race and their residence, 
weblining makes a “map of your travels across the Web” and may deny you 
opportunities based on presumptions about your digital self.447 
Economically marginalized and historically disadvantaged individuals 
can be weblined as a result of using cyberfinancing markets. Other e-
commerce sites can obtain not only the personal and financial information 
users provide to cyberfinancing sites, but also the ratings that those sites 
produce about their borrowers’ creditworthiness or their entrepreneurs’ 
popularity. The ratings and reputations that economically marginalized 
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and geographically isolated market actors develop through their participa-
tion in cyberfinancing can begin to define their “digital” selves. As eco-
nomic activity increasingly moves online, these determinations can impact 
how they will be rated or received on other e-commerce sites. These de-
terminations can either enhance or undermine an individual’s economic 
and social mobility. Most importantly, this will occur unbeknownst to the 
individuals affected and may remain largely out of their control. 
B. Comparative Institutional Analysis for Economic Justice 
The SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),448 
as the predominant institutions regulating the development of these cyber-
financing markets, are privileging lenders’ and investors’ interests over 
those of borrowers and entrepreneurs. As a result, this Article argues that 
several American regulators must coordinate to advance economic justice 
and to halt the unjust evolution of cyberfinancing markets. Since not all 
economic actors in cyberfinancing markets are similarly situated, and be-
cause these markets represent an unprecedented economic development 
opportunity for historically marginalized economic actors, the United 
States must balance the regulatory goal of economic justice against the 
competing objective of efficiency in order to promote the socially optimal 
regulation of these markets. Substituting economic justice as a regulatory 
goal, however, does not resolve the important question of institutional 
choice. Law and economics scholar Neil Komesar explains, “the choice of 
goals standing on its own dictates virtually nothing about law and public 
policy.”449 Comparative institutional analysis requires scholars to compare 
the relative merits of various large-scale institutions—the market, the legis-
lature, or the judiciary—in accomplishing a given goal. The operative ques-
tion is: given distributive justice as an additional or competing goal, which 
large-scale institutions should cooperatively regulate to attain that goal or, at 
least, to balance that goal against the competing choice of efficiency? 
The initial trajectory of cyberfinancing markets revealed that these mar-
kets, in pursuit of efficiency gains, did privilege all market actors’ access 
as an operative goal to gain a competitive advantage over other financial 
                                                 
448 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is the largest independent 
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institutions. Yet, as these markets evolved and courted more mainstream 
economic actors, they created benefits for lenders and investors and restrict-
ed marginalized actors’ access. Thus, an unregulated market—operating 
alone—is insufficient to actualize long-term distributive justice. The non-
profit organizational structure, which used to primarily facilitate exchange 
between the poor and the wealthy, is now insufficient—acting alone—to reg-
ulate all financial interactions between the poor and the wealthy in cyberspace. 
Because cyberfinancing intermediaries adopt a variety of organiza-
tional forms and endeavor to advance both profit-making and social goals, 
state charities’ regulators and the IRS—acting alone—are insufficient reg-
ulators of these market processes. Thus far, the political process—in the 
form of legislation to regulate P2P lending and crowdfunding—has let 
regulatory institutions that privilege mainstream economic actors’ interests 
shape regulatory responses. The SEC’s effort to regulate P2P lending led 
the intermediaries to restrict marginalized actors’ access and impose addi-
tional costs and burdens on borrowers. Although the JOBS Act holds 
promise for enhancing marginalized actors’ participation in these markets, 
it too imposes costs on small, fledgling entrepreneurs in order to provide 
benefits to mainstream investors. Thus, the regulatory process is leading to 
an ossification of a pro-lender and investor bias. Regulatory capture may 
also affect the SEC’s rulemaking process, enabling the interests of more 
established equity investors to predominate over the interests of first-time 
entrepreneurs seeking alternative sources of capital for their endeavors.450 
Given the emerging and complex nature of cyberfinancing markets, the 
judiciary—acting alone—also does not seem well-positioned to monitor 
systemic change and facilitate the actualization of this goal. Thus, this Ar-
ticle posits that all these institutions must coordinate to further economic 
justice in cyberfinancing markets. In particular, the legislature and admin-
istrative agencies seem best positioned to lead the charge and to help the 
other institutions respond. This is essential if cyberfinancing markets are 
to realize their distributive potential. 
1. Revising JOBS Act Provisions for Economic Justice 
Through its rulemaking authority, the SEC should create implement-
ing regulations that protect inexperienced EGCs from unintentional and 
                                                 
450 While the creation of a crowdfunding exemption in the JOBS Act was initially 
spearheaded by grassroots groups, the SEC is now seeking public comments in an-
ticipation of its upcoming rulemaking. Wall Street bankers and mainstream financial 
intermediaries could lobby the SEC to create rules that make it more difficult for smaller, 
first-time issuers to comply. See Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 7, at 23. 
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insignificant violations of the JOBS Act’s disclosure and reporting re-
quirements. Just as Rule 508 of Regulation D contains a “substantial com-
pliance rule,” which provides private placement securities issuers a de-
fense against innocent and immaterial violations of the exemption’s 
disclosure and reporting requirements,451 the SEC should create a “sub-
stantial compliance rule” that provides EGCs issuing crowdfunding securi-
ties an innocent and immaterial defense.452 While this rule may sacrifice 
benefits to investors by limiting the distribution of perfect information, it 
will advance distributive justice by eliminating barriers to the participation 
of smaller, unsophisticated EGCs. 
The SEC should also create a “two-tier system” for the crowdfunding ex-
emption that provides EGCs obtaining relatively small investments from a 
large number of investors with a reduced disclosure burden.453 However, un-
like the approach recommended by the ASBC, this reduced disclosure burden 
should apply to all small offerings instead of only local offerings. The ra-
tionale for a small local offering exemption is that those who invest in com-
panies in close geographical proximity can more easily obtain information 
about issuing EGCs because they can “see the products, visit the local office, 
meet with management and staff—all of which are difficult for long-distance 
investments.”454 Although this may be true, for many economically and geo-
graphically marginalized EGCs, these geographic limitations will undermine 
crowdfunding’s redistributive potential. 
Consequently, the SEC should also create a reduced regulatory burden 
for ECGs that sell an aggregate of up to only $100,000 to investors in a 
twelve-month period and who do not sell more than an aggregate of $250 to 
any one investor in a twelve-month period.455 Although this proposal leaves 
intact higher disclosure requirements for marginalized EGCs who receive 
higher investments, it reduces the regulatory burden for smaller amounts. 
Two hundred fifty dollars from 1000 investors each can be a significant 
amount for a first-time entrepreneur, whereas the risk of loss of $250 to one 
individual is not as great as the benefit to the entrepreneur.456 Finally, the 
SEC’s role as regulator is limited to enforcing and monitoring information dis-
closures in the sale of crowdfunding equity interests, an appropriate role for the 
SEC. However, other regulators should also monitor crowdfunding intermedi-
aries’ performance in facilitating economic justice in these markets. Yet, the 
existing regulatory structure does not identify a regulator for this function. 
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2. Modernizing the CRA and Facilitating Regulatory Coordination 
Given that cyberfinancing intermediaries adopt a range of organizational 
forms and perform some of the intermediating functions of banks and other 
financial services institutions, the existing legal framework of consumer 
protection, financial access, community economic development, and finan-
cial education should be harmonized with and adapted to the new institu-
tional realities of cyberspace and e-commerce. As globalization and finan-
cial modernization extricate financial markets from the restrictions of insti-
institutional and geographic boundaries, the law must also adapt. The CRA 
is the preeminent statute that expands geographically isolated and economi-
cally marginalized economic actors’ access to legitimate financial institu-
tions. CRA accomplishes this because by forcing large traditional banks and 
thrifts to lend in low-income minority communities, in a responsible way, it 
remedies both the geographic and non-geographic market failures that pre-
clude low-income and economically marginalized actors from accessing 
mainstream markets.457 CRA responds to geographic market failures by in-
creasing the number of transactions to low-income communities; and thereby 
enhancing the information about, and “market thickness” for, lending and in-
vesting to low-income individuals and communities.458 CRA could also help 
promote market thickness and minimize information asymmetries about lend-
ing and investing to low-income, geographically isolated, and economically 
marginalized individuals in cyberspace. 
Yet the CRA’s protections have not kept pace with institutional changes 
in the financial services delivery system in the United States. The controver-
sial Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2009 (CRMA),459 
which died in committee, held the most promise to extend CRA obligations to 
other financial institutions. Borrowing from CRMA’s innovations, this Arti-
cle recommends that the CRA’s protections should be extended to cover a 
range of non-depository institutions and nonbank affiliates that engage in 
“banking products and services,”460 such as mortgage lenders, securities 
companies, insurance companies, and large credit unions.461 Further, the 
CRA should cover new large cyberfinancing intermediary portals and the 
                                                 
457 See Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and 
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banking institutions with whom they partner. Despite a particular crowdfund-
ing intermediary’s organizational structure (that is, for-profit or non-profit), if 
the organization fulfills a substantial financial function, such as Kiva, then it 
should be covered by CRA’s provisions.462 However, CRA’s implementing 
regulations should create a reduced regulatory burden for non-profit or for-
profit intermediaries that are primarily established to advance charitable or 
social justice goals. Additionally, federal and state laws regulating charitable 
non-profits should be harmonized with existing federal and state securities 
laws and regulations.463 Currently, non-profits formed for charitable purposes 
are exempt from certain securities registration requirements.464 As a result, it 
is unclear if non-profits would be covered by the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding 
provisions covering “funding portals,” and “EGCs.” 
The revised CRA statute, proposed here, would acknowledge that all fi-
nancial sectors, such as mortgage banks, securities companies, insurance 
companies, large credit unions, and new cyberfinancing intermediaries, 
have affirmative obligations to meet the financial needs of the communities 
they serve, including low- to moderate-income neighborhoods and econom-
ically marginal and historically disadvantaged users of cyberfinancing mar-
kets. Like the CRMA, the CRA statute would include a revised “assessment 
area” definition that includes not only the geographic areas where covered 
financial institutions have a physical presence, have ATMs, or where they 
purchase or originate loans, but also geographic areas and cyberspaces 
where the institution “enjoys 0.5 percent of the market share of the business 
in a particular community, and where ‘the great majority’ of [its] ... business 
originates.”465 This rule would force cyberfinancing intermediaries to find 
ways to financially serve American markets and users from low- to moder-
ate-income geographic areas in the United States.466 
Equity crowdfunding intermediaries would be securities companies un-
der the statute, and therefore, the SEC would have additional responsibili-
ties to ensure that such institutions fulfill their CRA obligations.467 Mort-
gage banks, insurance companies, and large credit unions would be regulated 
by the CFPB, but other regulators—such as the Treasury, the Secretary of 
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Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem—would coordinate with the CFPB. Similar to the reporting require-
ments under CRMA, the revised CRA statute should require all covered 
financial institutions to collect and report to regulators important demo-
graphic data on users, the distribution of loans to borrowers, and invest-
ments to entrepreneurs. This data would be made available to the public 
for three years.468 Further, like the CRMA, the CRA statute proposed here 
would expand the CRA ratings process to include more gradations and to 
generate multiple assessment ratings as well as an overall rating. The pro-
posed CRA statute would add the ratings of “low satisfactory” and “high 
satisfactory,” and it would adopt the CRMA’s requirement that all institu-
tions that receive a “low satisfactory” or “needs to improve” rating submit 
to the CFPB a “CRA improvement plan” that would be made public and 
available for comment.”469 The revised CRA statute would also authorize 
regulators to impose significant penalties on covered institutions for sub-
stantial compliance failures. Notably, smaller P2P lenders or cyberfinancing 
intermediaries that generate less than $20 million in revenue would not be 
subject to these requirements because the costs of the regulatory burden 
would preclude such organizations from participating in cyberfinancing 
markets. Further, the revised CRA statute would not provide private liti-
gants a private right of action to submit agency implementation of the act 
to judicial review because the costs of such a right, in terms of increased 
litigation, might outweigh the benefits. 
3. Public Subsidies and Market Incentives 
The revised CRA proposed here should also give covered institutions 
credit for lending to or investing in CDFIs that invest in P2P lending sites 
or crowdfunding intermediaries that substantially serve low- to moderate-
income individuals or communities, or that are established to serve an 
economic justice mission. This would harmonize the existing framework of 
American CED laws with changes in the financial services delivery sys-
tem occurring in cyberspace. Further, P2P lending or crowdfunding inter-
mediaries that substantially facilitate loans and investments to economical-
ly marginal or historically disadvantaged borrowers or entrepreneurs, and 
that include such individuals on their boards, could qualify as CDEs under 
the NMTC. As CDEs, these cyberfinancing intermediaries could receive tax 
credits from the Treasury to spur private investment for socially beneficial 
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economic activities. The public subsidies provided through tax credits could 
spur private investors seeking tax breaks on profits to finance the costs of 
the cyberfinancing intermediaries’ compliance with laws that encourage 
them to facilitate lending and investing to marginal and historically disad-
vantaged economic actors. This would partially offset the costs of the reg-
ulatory burdens suggested above. This framework would also incentivize 
cyberfinancing intermediaries to develop laws, interactive rules, and poli-
cies that will incentivize their users to interact with historically marginal-
ized economic actors. Smaller cyberfinancing intermediaries, which are 
not covered under the revised CRA statute, could also qualify as CDEs 
under a revised NMTC Act, thereby incentivizing them to develop laws, 
policies, and interactive rules that facilitate lending and investing to mar-
ginalized economic actors. 
4. Self-Regulation, Community Education, and Legal Infrastructure470 
As these cyberfinancing industries evolve and professionalize, self-
regulation alone will not ensure economic justice. Thus far, the P2P lend-
ing industry has moved away from innovations that serve a comprehensive 
market. As the SEC is developing its rulemaking to implement the JOBS 
Act provisions, various industry self-regulatory associations such as the 
National Crowdfunding Association—started by a financial lawyer—and 
the Crowdfunding Professional Organization—started by an industry 
player—are already vying for control of the crowdfunding market.471 The 
CFIRA,472 which helped sponsor the crowdfunding exemption, also en-
deavors to lead the industry.473 Self-regulation in other industries has often 
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led to a subordination of the interests of marginalized groups.474 Although 
industry self-regulators can identify best practices for economic justice in 
crowdfunding industries, U.S. regulators will need to encourage these in-
dustries to advance economic justice. Further, some industry self-regulatory 
groups, such as the CFIRA or the Sustainable Economies Law Center—a 
non-profit, public interest, legal organization—must provide community legal 
education to help marginalized economic actors navigate this new terrain. 
This training should not be required because it will inevitably raise cyber-
financing participants’ transaction costs, but it should be available for those 
first-time economic actors who desire it. 
Additionally, as legal scholar Gillian Hadfield eloquently explained, 
the legal infrastructure needed to support efficient transactions in tech-
nology-driven markets that cross firm and jurisdictional boundaries has 
not kept pace with technological innovations.475 The regulatory structure 
for cyberfinancing described here will require the development of such a 
legal infrastructure. Lastly, the regulatory scheme recommended above 
requires significant regulatory coordination among agencies. The CFPB, 
acting as a primary regulator, would help facilitate coordination, but U.S. 
agencies must also collaborate. Coordination with international financial 
regulators must also occur as the geographic boundaries between these 
markets continue to disintegrate.476 Regulatory coordination is always 
difficult, but the regulatory framework suggested above begins to facili-
tate the cooperation necessary to advance economic justice in these 
emerging markets. 
CONCLUSION 
As new cyberfinancing markets facilitate exchange across boundaries 
and among economic and demographic groups, the law must adapt. Alt-
hough cyberfinancing markets present opportunities for individuals and 
groups historically marginalized from American mainstream markets to ac-
cess new sources of financing, they must be regulated to facilitate distribu-
tive justice. Existing proposals to regulate P2P lending and crowdfunding in 
the United States do not advance economic justice. This Article provides a 
framework for regulating cyberfinancing for economic justice that requires 
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regulators to re-conceptualize the process of exchange between the wealthy 
and the poor, as well as the legal structures that facilitate exchange between 
these groups. Just as jurisdictional boundaries and land use laws order mar-
kets in geographic space, cyberfinancing intermediaries’ laws and interac-
tional rules order who can benefit from the markets that occur in cyber-
space. The United States must incentivize these intermediaries to encourage 
the participation of marginalized economic actors in these markets. Ameri-
can regulators must also harmonize existing laws that regulate financial 
transactions in the United States with the new technological and organiza-
tional innovations that cyberfinancing markets create. Just as space, power, 
and law are linked in geographic space, so they are linked in cyberspace. 
The United States must develop a regulatory structure that advances eco-
nomic justice in these markets before they substantially evolve. 
